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Discretionary Trusts: An Update
Richard C. Ausness*
I. INTRODUCTION.
It has been more than fifty years since the late Dean Halbach pub-
lished his seminal article on discretionary trusts in the Columbia Law
Review.' Unfortunately, although there have been a number of signifi-
cant developments in this area since then, very little scholarship has
been produced. Hopefully, this Article provides a modest update on this
fascinating subject. Specifically, this Article will consider developments
during the past half-century, particularly with respect to distributive is-
sues, from the perspective settlors and courts, beneficiaries and the
creditors of such beneficiaries.2
In the past, settlors tended to limit a trustee's discretion by setting
forth a specific formula for the distribution of trust assets. For example,
a family trust might direct the trustee to distribute the trust income in
equal shares to the settlor's children. After the death of the last child,
the trust corpus would be distributed to the settlor's grandchildren in
equal shares or in accordance some other standard or formula. Nowa-
days, however, settlors often prefer to vest more discretion in their trust-
ees. This is partly due to the fact that beneficiaries tend to live longer
and, therefore, trusts inevitably last longer, thereby requiring trustees to
respond to changing conditions. In addition, settlors often believe that
vesting increased discretion on the part of trustees will discourage bene-
ficiaries from bringing expensive and disruptive challenges to their
decisions. 3
Nevertheless, the trend toward increased discretion is not without
its problems. First of all, there is a need to balance the wishes of the
settlor against the duty of the courts to oversee the conduct of trustees
and other fiduciaries. In addition, it is also necessary for courts to bal-
ance the wishes of the settlor with the right of the beneficiaries to re-
ceive fair and impartial treatment. Finally, it is necessary to determine
* Associate Dean for Faculty Research and Stites & Harbison Professor of Law,
University of Kentucky. B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968, University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale
Law School.
1 See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Problems of Discretion in Discretionary
Trusts, 61 COLUM. L. REv. 1425 (1961).
2 See id.
3 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50, cmt. c (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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when, if ever, creditors should be able to reach a beneficiary's interest in
a discretionary trust.
Part II begins with a description of the various linguistic formulas
that settlors have typically used to describe the scope of a trustee's dis-
cretion. It concludes that no language, however broad, can completely
shield a trustee from judicial scrutiny. It then examines some standards
courts invoke when they purport to review the exercise of discretion by
trustees. These standards can be classified as subjective, objective or
some combination of both.4 However, as Dean Halbach predicted 5 the
trend seems to be moving toward an objective or reasonableness stan-
dard and away from the narrower subjective or good faith standard.
Part III examines the rights of beneficiaries and distinguishes be-
tween mandatory and discretionary support trusts on one hand, and
purely discretionary trusts on the other. In the case of support trusts,
whether discretionary or mandatory, courts have often intervened when
they thought that the distributions were too parsimonious or when the
trustees favored remainder beneficiaries too much. In contrast, in the
case of purely discretionary trusts, courts tend to uphold a trustee's ex-
ercise of discretion as long as it is not tainted with bad faith or improper
motivation. However, they have required trustees to render accountings
and carry out other fiduciary duties no matter how broad the scope of
their discretion was.
Part IV is concerned with the rights of creditors. In general, discre-
tionary and support trusts are treated much like spendthrift trusts. Cred-
itors appear to fare better when the trust is a support trust. Providers of
necessary goods and services can usually compel the trustee to make
disbursements to them and other favored creditors-such as spouses,
ex-spouses and minor children-are often allowed to reach a benefici-
ary's interest in a trust. On the other hand, creditors usually cannot
reach a beneficiary's interest in a discretionary trust although the Uni-
form Trust Code and the Restatement approve of Hamilton orders and
similar remedies by which creditors can attach distributions before they
are transferred to debtor beneficiaries.
Finally, Part V suggests some improvements in certain problem ar-
eas. For example, it would helpful to agree on a single test for determin-
ing whether an abuse of discretion has occurred. This test should require
a finding of either bad faith or unreasonable behavior on the part of the
trustee. In addition, words such as "comfort" or "station-in-life" are not
necessary to describe a beneficiary's interest in a support trust and
4 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 187, cmt. d (incorporating both stan-'
dards as "factors" for a court to take into account in deciding whether a trustee is guilty
of an abuse of discretion).
5 Halbach, supra note 1, at 1431.
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should be ignored, although other words, such as "benefit," "best inter-
ests," or "welfare" are appropriate when the settlor intends to provide
the beneficiary with a more upscale lifestyle than mere support. Further-
more, the trustee of a support trust should be allowed to take a benefici-
ary's other resources into account in determining how much to
distribute unless directed otherwise by the settlor. When reviewing a
trustee's decision in the case of a purely discretionary trust, the courts
should apply a reasonableness standard unless the settlor expressly pro-
vides that a good faith standard may be used. Lastly, Part V addresses
the thorny issue of creditors' rights and concludes that creditors should
normally not be able to compel the trustee of a support trust or a purely
discretionary trust to pay a beneficiary's debts. The only exception to
this rule should be for child support and providers of necessities in the
case of support trusts.
II. DISCRETION IN THE LAW OF TRUSTS.
Over the years, appellate courts have exercised the power to review
the conduct of lower courts and administrative agencies. This necessarily
requires reviewing courts to avoid micro-managing the actions of lower
courts and administrative agencies, particularly when the legislature has
vested them with extensive discretion. Accordingly, appellate courts
have developed standards of review, such as "clearly erroneous," "de
novo" and "abuse of discretion" that reflect the degree of oversight that
appellate courts consider to be appropriate. 6 Unfortunately, the stan-
dard of review is not so clear where private parties, such as trustees, are
concerned.
A. The Meaning of Discretion.
Discretion may be defined as the power or authority to choose
among various alternatives.7 Discretion may be absolute in the sense
that a person cannot be compelled to act in a particular way and is not
subject to any external standard. However, discretion has a different
meaning in the law than it does in ordinary discourse. When used as a
6 See Steve P. Calandrillo & Joseph Davison, Standards of Review in Law and
Sports: How Instant Replay's Asymmetric Burdens Subvert Accuracy and Justice, 8 HARV.
J. SPORTS & ENr. L. 1, 1344 (2017) (briefly discussing these standards of appellate
review).
7 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Home Builders v. Defs. of Wildlife, 551 U.S. 644, 668
(2007) (defining discretion as "the power or right to decide or act according to one's own
judgment"); Gilbert St. Developers, LLC v. La Quinta Homes, LLC, 94 Cal. Rptr. 3d
918, 1197 (Ct. App. 2009) (defining discretion as "the action of separating or distinguish-
ing"); Golden Christian Acad. v. Zelman, 760 N.E.2d 889, 896 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001)
(defining discretion as the "ability to make responsible decisions").
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legal term of art, discretion is never truly absolute; rather, the term is
used to describe the power of various persons to exercise their indepen-
dent judgment. However, this exercise of judgment will usually be sub-
ject to some sort of social or legal accountability.
A number of commentators have written about the nature of dis-
cretion in the law and in almost every case, they agree that discretion
can never be completely unrestrained. For example, Ronald Dworkin
argues that discretion exists only when a person has the power to make
decisions but is subject to restrictions that are established by a higher
authority.8 According to Dworkin, "[d]iscretion, like a hole in a dough-
nut, does not exist except as an area left open by a surrounding belt of
restriction."9 Dworkin also distinguishes between discretion in the weak
sense and discretion in the strong sense. 10 In the former case, the deci-
sion-maker is not bound by standards, while in the latter case, he is
bound by standards; however, he has some leeway to interpret these
standards and in some cases they may not be enforced by a higher
authority."
One form of weak discretion involves situations where the applica-
ble standards are not sufficiently precise, but instead require that the
decision-maker exercise judgment.12 For example, when a superior of-
ficer orders a sergeant to select his five most experienced men to go out
on patrol, this effectively gives the sergeant the discretion to determine
which soldiers in his platoon are the most experienced. 13 Another form
of weak discretion exists when the person who has the final authority to
make a decision cannot be reviewed or reversed by any higher author-
ity.1 4 For example, in baseball, umpires are supposed to call a game ac-
cording to a set of written rules. However, until recently, their calls were
not subject to appeal. Thus, for example, as Dworkin points out, a sec-
ond base umpire's call as to whether a runner is out or safe at second
base is final and cannot be overruled by another official.15
Discretion in a strong sense exists when one who exercises such
discretion is not bound by standards set by a higher authority. 16 As an
8 See Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. Cm. L. REV. 14, 32 (1967).
9 Id.
10 Id. at 32-34.
11 See Edward R. Rubin, Discretion and Its Discontents, 72 Cm.-Kwr L. REV. 1299,
1301 (1997).
12 See Dworkin, supra note 8, at 32.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id. at 33. Nowadays either team's manager can challenge a safe or out call, as well
as many other decisions, by members of the officiating crew. See Calandrillo & Davison,
supra note 6, at 18-21.
16 Dworkin, supra note 8, at 33.
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example of this, Dworkin cites the case of a judge in a dog show who has
the discretion to judge Airedales before Boxers or vice versa. The
judge's decision to judge one breed before the other might be criticized
on the basis of rationality, fairness or effectiveness, but no one will have
the power to overrule it.17
Maurice Rosenberg distinguishes between primary and secondary
forms of discretion.18 Primary discretion exists, at least in the case of
members of the judiciary, when a judge has "a wide range of choice as to
what he decides, free from the constraints which characteristically attach
whenever legal rules enter the decision process." 19 For example, novel
legal issues often involve primary discretion. 20 Such issues occur when
changes in the law or technological or societal developments give rise to
unanticipated situations that are not already addressed by existing stat-
utes or legal precedents. 21
Rosenberg's secondary form of discretion occurs when the rules of
review substantially insulate a lower court ruling from review by an ap-
pellate court.22 An example of this would be a decision of a trial court to
deny a motion for a new trial. This particular exercise of secondary dis-
cretion may be obviously incorrect, and thus subject to criticism by third
parties, but it cannot, or will not, be overruled by a higher authority.23
Another view of discretion appears in the work of Henry Hart and
Albert Sacks.24 According to them, discretion may be defined as "the
power to choose between two or more courses of action each of which is
thought of as permissible." 2 5 According to Hart and Sacks, one who ex-
ercises discretion has the power to make a choice, whether that power is
based on the inevitability of judgment, the absence of review by a higher
authority or an absence of binding standards. 26
Finally, George Christie argues that accountability, as well as
choice, is essential to the exercise of discretion. According to Christie,
"[o]nly where there is accountability can we meaningfully speak of dis-
17 Id. at 33-34.
18 See Maurice Rosenberg, Judicial Discretion of the Trial Court, Viewed from
Above, 22 SYRACUSE L. REv. 635, 637 (1971).
19 Id.
20 See Pauline T. Kim, Lower Court Discretion, 82 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 420 (2007).
21 Id. at 420-21.
22 Rosenberg, supra note 18, at 637.
23 Id. at 639-40.
24 See HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAw (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip
P. Frickey eds., 1994).
25 Id. at 144.
26 Id.; see Kim, supra note 20, at 408-09.
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cretion in choice. Accountability, not the existence of standards, is the
identifying feature of contexts in which discretion is 'at home." 27
Most of these commentators focus on the extent to whether discre-
tionary acts are subject to some sort of review by another entity such as
a court or a government agency. However, even when such review is
possible, there remains the question of what standard of review will be
employed. As we shall see, the scope of an actor's discretion will be
much greater if the standard of review is narrow than if it is very broad.
B. Mandatory Versus Discretionary Provisions in Trusts.
Although, it is common to classify trusts and mandatory or discre-
tionary, in fact, many trusts are hybrids which contain both mandatory
and discretionary provisions. 28 For instance, in Wight v. Mason,29 the
testamentary trust in question directed the trustee to pay $2000 from the
net income to Florence Mason for life. 30 This, of course, was a
mandatory provision. The trust also directed the trustee to pay the re-
mainder of the income to the testator's daughter, Winifred Devine, for
life. This was also a mandatory provision. However, the trust went on to
authorize the trustees to pay "such portion or portions of the principal
sum for [Winifred's] proper maintenance and support as in their judg-
ment may seem wise." 31 This latter provision was discretionary since the
trustees were allowed to decide whether it was appropriate to invade the
principal for Winifred's benefit and, if so, to determine how much of the
principal was necessary to provide for her "proper maintenance and
support."
Another example of a hybrid trust can be found in Woodard v.
Mordecai.32 In that case, the testator, Moses Woodard, established a tes-
tamentary trust for the benefit of his wife, son and daughter.33 The will
provided that the wife, son and daughter would receive an equal share
of the trust income.34 This provision was mandatory in nature. However,
the will also declared,
27 See George C. Christie, An Essay on Discretion, 1986 DuvE L.J. 747, 752 (1986).
28 See, e.g., Clarke v. Clarke, 19 So. 2d. 526, 528-29 (Ala. 1944); Strawn v. Caffee,
178 So. 430, 430 (Ala. 1938); In re Greenleaf's Estate, 225 P.2d 945, 946-48 (Cal. Ct. App.
1951); Kemp v. Paterson, 159 N.E.2d 661, 662 (N.Y. 1959); In re Solveson's Will, 34
N.W.2d 150, 151 (Wis. 1948).
29 180 A. 917 (Me. 1935).
30 Id. at 918.
31 Id.
32 67 S.E.2d 639 (N.C. 1951).
33 Id. at 640.
34 Id. at 641-42. The will further provided that if the son or daughter should die
before the testator, the share of deceased child would go to his or her lineal descendants.
Id.
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The said Trustees (if they in their judgment deem it necessary
or best for the welfare of the cestui que trust, and consistent
with the welfare of my family and estate) may from time to
time, advance, deliver and convey absolutely and in fee simple,
free from the trust, to my said wife if unmarried or to my said
daughter after she arrives at the age of 21 years or to my son
after he arrives at the age of 21 years, any part or all of the
share of the corpus of the trust estate above provided for his or
her benefit and thus terminate the trust so far as it affects the
property so advanced, delivered and conveyed. . .. 5
The court correctly found this provision to be discretionary since the
trustees could, if they chose, distribute to an income beneficiary some or
all of his or her share of the trust principal.36
1. Mandatory Provisions.
Mandatory provisions may be either administrative or distributive
in nature. Administrative provisions deal with the management of the
trust and its property. For example, the settlor may specify the types of
investments that the trustee is authorized to make, as well as those that
he should avoid. The trust instrument may also identify the situs of the
trust or the applicable law that will be applied. Other administrative
provisions may set forth the schedule and method of making distribu-
tions and it may also provide for how and when the trustee will render
accountings. Finally, the trust instrument may specify what expenses will
be deducted from income and what expenses will be deducted from the
trust principal.
A mandatory provision may also require the trustee to distribute
income or principal according to an objective formula. A simple exam-
ple of such a mandatory provision is one that directs the trustee to dis-
tribute the net annual income to a particular beneficiary for life. At the
death of the income beneficiary, the trust instrument might direct the
trustee to transfer the trust corpus to a specified remainder beneficiary
free of trust. Of course, it is possible for a settlor to devise more compli-
cated arrangements involving multiple classes of beneficiaries, but the
underlying principle is the same, namely that the trustee is not permit-
ted to deviate from the prescribed distributional formula.
The will of Alber Howarth is illustrative of this approach.3 7 Alber
was survived by a son, Albert, and two sisters, Gertrude and Alice.38
35 Id. at 642.
36 Id. at 642-43.
37 See Lees v. Howarth, 131 A.2d 229, 229-30 (R.I. 1957).
38 Id. at 230.
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Alber devised half of his estate in trust and directed the trustee to pay
the entire income to Albert during his life and upon his death to his
issue then living.39 If Albert died without issue, the income was to be
paid to Gertrude and Alice in equal shares.40 Finally, if at the time of
Albert's death he was not survived by issue or by either sister, Albert
was given a general testamentary power of appointment over the trust
corpus. 41 It can be seen that under this arrangement, unlike Albert, the
trustees had no discretion over the distribution of either the income or
the corpus of the trust.
2. Discretionary Provisions.
Although administrative powers and duties are usually viewed as
mandatory in nature, in fact many of them necessarily involve a measure
of discretion. For example, the settlor may vest the trustee with broad
discretion over the management of trust property or investments. The
trust in Estate of Genung42 is illustrative. It declared that "[s]aid trustees
shall administer said trust as in their judgment and discretion shall seem
proper, and are vested with full authority to sell, convey, encumber,
mortgage, loan or otherwise transfer or alienate any and all property
belonging to such trust. . . ."43
In addition, modem trust instruments often authorize trustees to
exercise discretion over the distribution of trust property to the trust
beneficiaries.44 In such cases, the beneficiaries are only entitled to such
income or principal that the trustee in the exercise of his discretion
chooses to distribute. 45 Discretionary trusts take a variety of forms. For
example, the trust instrument may authorize the trustee to pay so much
of the trust income to a particular beneficiary as the trustee deems to be
appropriate and accumulate the rest for distribution, along with the rest
of the trust principal, when the beneficiary reaches a certain age.4 6
When there are multiple beneficiaries in a class, the settlor may
create a trust under which income may be distributed among income
beneficiaries or retained as part of the trust principal. In the case of a
spray trust, the trustee is required to distribute all of the trust income to
39 Id.
40 Id.
41 Id.
42 In re Estate of Genung, 326 P.2d 861 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
43 Id. at 862; see also In re Greenleaf's Estate, 225 P.2d 945, 949 (Cal. Ct. App.
1951).
44 See UNW. TRUST CODE §§ 504(b), 506(a) cmt (UNiF. LAW COMM'N 2010). For
example, a trust instrument may direct the trustee to distribute all of the trust income
each year to beneficiaries A, B and C in equal shares.
45 See Di Portanova v. Monroe, 229 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. App. 2006).
46 See Caswell v. Lenihan, 126 N.E.2d 902, 904 (Ohio 1955).
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the trust beneficiaries. However, the trustee may also be empowered to
decide how much income, if anything, a particular beneficiary will re-
ceive during any given distribution period. 47 In contrast, if the trust is a
sprinkle trust, the trustee may be given the power to distribute all of the
trust income to the income beneficiaries or to withhold some or all of it
and allow it to accumulate. 48
Regardless of whether a mandatory or discretionary approach is
employed with respect to the distribution of trust income, it is not un-
common for a settlor to authorize the trustee to invade the trust corpus
and distribute some or all of the trust corpus to certain beneficiaries. 49
In some cases, the trustee may even be authorized to transfer the entire
trust corpus to a beneficiary and to effectively terminate the trust.5 0
However, the discretionary power to invade is more commonly found in
support trusts where the trustee is empowered to provide extra funds
from the trust corpus to an income beneficiary in order to cover unfore-
seen expenses.51
C. Judicial Review of a Trustee's Exercise of Discretion.
Despite solemn assurances that they will faithfully carry out the set-
tlor's intent,52 courts have not hesitated to review and overturn a trus-
tee's exercise of discretion. In doing so, the courts have approached
claims of abuse of discretion in different ways. Some courts focus on the
47 See, e.g., McPherson v. McPherson, 705 S.E.2d 314, 316 (Ga. Ct. App. 2011); Con-
lin v. Murdock, 43 A.2d 218, 219 (N.J. Ch. 1945); In re Golodetz' Will, 118 N.Y.S.2d 707,
710 (Sur. Ct. 1952); see also Mark R. Siegal, IR.C. Section 1014(E) and Gifted Property
Reconveyed in Trust, 27 AKRON TAX J. 33, 43 n.50 (2011).
48 See, e.g., Newton v. Shepard, 22 N.E.2d 618, 619 (Mass. 1939); United States v.
O'Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 576 (Minn. 1994); Hurtig v. Gabrielson, 525 N.W.2d
612, 613 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); Conlin, 43 A.2d at 218-19; Moskowitz v. Federman, 51
N.E.2d 48, 51 (Ohio Ct. App. 1943); Di Portanova, 229 S.W.3d at 327-28.
49 See Halbach, supra note 1, at 1426.
50 See, e.g., Bos. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Stebbins, 34 N.E.2d 616, 616-17 (Mass.
1941); Am. Cancer Soc'y, St. Louis Div. v. Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1981); In re Bisconti's Will, 119 N.E.2d 34, 35 (N.Y. 1954); In re Rachlin's Will, 133
N.Y.S.2d 151, 151-52 (Sur. Ct. 1954); Woodard v. Mordecai, 67 S.E.2d 639, 642 (N.C.
1951); Tomazic v. Rapoport, 977 N.E.2d 1068, 1070 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012); In re Estate of
Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189, 190 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957). But see Athorne v. Athorne, 128
A.2d 910, 911 (N.H. 1957); Kemp v. Paterson, 159 N.E.2d 661, 661-62 (N.Y. 1959).
51 See, e.g., Ventura Cty. Dep't of Child Support Servs. v. Brown, 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d
489, 492 (Ct. App. 2004); Ludwig v. Ludwig, 642 S.E.2d 638, 639-40 (Ga. 2007); Hemphill
v. Shore, 289 P.3d 1173, 1176 (Kan. 2012); Deutsch v. Wolfe, 994 S.W.2d 561, 564 (Mo.
1999); In re J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 956 N.Y.S.2d 856, 858-59 (Sur. Ct. 2012); In
re Chase Manhattan Bank, 775 N.Y.S.2d 484, 486 (Sur. Ct. 2004).
52 See Finch v. Wachovia Bank & Tr. Co., N.A., 577 S.E.2d 306, 310 (N.C. Ct. App.
2003); First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Wyo. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224, 229 (Wyo. 1966); In
re Chase Manhattan Bank, 775 N.Y.S.2d at 485.
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positive side and purport to identify the characteristics of an appropriate
exercise of discretion by a trustee. These courts will uphold an exercise
of discretion if they conclude that the trustee acted either "in good
faith"53 or "with good faith and with an honest purpose"5 4 or with
"proper motives, in good faith, with wisdom and reasonable judg-
ment"5 5 or "honest judgment in good faith"5 6 or "in good faith and
within the limits of a sound discretion"57 or "in the reasonable exercise
of ... discretion"58 or "fairly and reasonably" 59 or "in good faith and ...
fairly and reasonably"60 or with "good faith and honesty" 61 or "within
the bounds of reasonable judgment" 62 or "in good faith, according to
their best judgment and uninfluenced by improper motives." 63
Other courts focus on whether the trustee is guilty of an abuse of
discretion.6" Unfortunately, this term is more of a conclusion than a sub-
stantive standard. Perhaps, this is why many courts either add additional
verbiage or identify specific factors that they believe are indicative of an
abuse of discretion. For example, courts have declared that they will
overturn a trustee's exercise of discretion if they find that it involves
"fraud, bad faith or an abuse of discretion" 65 or "fraud, misconduct, or
clear abuse of discretion" 66 or "abuse of discretion or bad faith" 67 or
"bad faith or fraud" 68 or "acts beyond the bounds of reasonable judg-
ment" 69 or "acts arbitrarily, fraudulently, dishonestly or with an im-
proper motive" 70 or that discretion was "not reasonably exercised." 7 '
53 See Lees v. Howarth, 131 A.2d 229, 232 (R.I. 1957); Rinker v. Simpson, 166 S.E.
546, 549 (Va. 1932).
54 Carter v. Young, 137 S.E. 875, 877 (N.C. 1927).
55 Clarke v. Clarke, 19 So. 2d 526, 528-29 (Ala. 1944).
56 Corkery v. Dorsey, 111 N.E. 795, 796 (Mass. 1916).
57 Culver v. Culver, 169 N.E.2d 486, 488 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
58 Rogers v. Munsey, 164 A.2d 554, 556 (N.H. 1960).
59 Stallard v. Johnson, 116 P.2d 965, 967 (Okla. 1941).
60 In re Estate of Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189, 192 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
61 First Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co. of Wyo. v. Finkbiner, 416 P.2d 224, 230 (Wyo. 1966).
62 In re Kaminester's Will, 184 N.Y.S.2d 237, 239-40 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
63 Wight v. Mason, 180 A. 917, 920 (Me. 1935).
64 See Am. Cancer Soc'y, St. Louis Div. v. Hammerstein, 631 S.W.2d 858, 859 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1981); Schofield v. Commerce Tr. Co., 319 S.W.2d 275, 277 (Mo. Ct. App. 1958);
Finch v. Wachovia Nat'l Bank & Tr. Co., N.A., 577 S.E.2d 306, 309 (N.C. Ct. App. 2003);
see also RESTATEMENT (TmRD) OF TRUSTS § 50 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
65 Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Tr. Co., 70 A.2d 105, 108 (Conn. 1949).
66 Di Portanova v. Monroe, 229 S.W.3d 324, 330 (Tex. App. 2006); Beaty v. Bales,
677 S.W.2d 750, 754 (Tex. App. 1984).
67 In re Greenleaf's Estate, 225 P.2d 945, 948 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
68 Cleveland Clinic Found. v. Humphrys, 97 F.2d 849, 858 (6th Cir. 1938).
69 Conlin v. Murdock, 43 A.2d 218, 220 (N.J. Ch. 1945).
70 Fay v. Grafton, 484 S.W.3d 333, 338 (Mo. Ct. App. 2015).
71 In re Estate of Genung, 326 P.2d 861, 864 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958).
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Whether courts use positive or negative terminology to describe
when they will override a trustee's exercise of discretion, most of them
seem to rely on one of two distinct standards. The first standard focuses
on the trustee's motivation or intent.72 References to "good faith," "bad
faith," "fraud," "proper motives" and "improper motives" all involve an
inquiry into the trustee's subjective state of mind. Tomazic v. Rapoport
illustrates the standard nicely.73 In 2009, the testator, David Tomazic,
created a revocable trust under which his daughter, Jennine, was to re-
ceive a share of the trust corpus when she attained the age of thirty-
five.7 4 However, the trust instrument also provided that Jennine would
receive nothing if the trustee, in the exercise of his "sole and unlimited
discretion," determined that she was not of "sufficiently sound mind and
character" at that time.75 Finally, the settlor named Alan J. Rapoport as
the trustee.76
David died shortly after executing the trust instrument and Rapo-
port continued to serve as trustee.77 In 2011, Rapoport offered to trans-
fer certain trust property, a house in Euclid, Ohio, to Jennine as full
satisfaction of the distribution she was entitled to under the trust.78 Jen-
nine refused Rapoport's offer and brought suit to remove him as trustee
for various breaches of fiduciary duty shortly before reaching the age of
thirty-five.79 Rapoport then informed Jennine that he had concluded
that she was not of sufficiently sound mind and character and was termi-
nating her interest in the trust.80 He then moved to dismiss Jennine's
suit against him for lack of standing.81
Finding that Jennine had standing,82 the court reviewed Rapoport's
decision to terminate Jennine's interest in the trust.8 3 The court ob-
served that "even a grant of absolute discretion will be controlled by the
court if the trustee acts in bad faith, dishonestly, or with an improper
motive." 84 In this case, it concluded that Rapoport's decision to termi-
72 See Wight v. Mason, 180 A. 917, 920 (Me. 1935) (declaring that the settlor in-
tended that his trustee act "according to his best judgment, not the judgment of some one
else ..... ) (emphasis in original).
73 977 N.E.2d 1068 (Ohio Ct. App. 2012).
74 Id. at 1070.
75 Id. at 1071.
76 Id. at 1069.
7 Id. at 1070.
78 Id.
79 Id. Jennine filed suit on November 15, 2011, and reached the age of thirty-five on
December 9, 2011. Id. at 1071 n.1.
80 Id. at 1071.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 1072.
83 Id. at 1072-73.
84 Id.
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nate Jennine's interest in the trust was motivated solely by his desire to
prevent her from pursuing her claims against him for breach of trust.8 5
In the court's view, this was an improper motive and, therefore, it held
in favor of Jennine and invalidated Rapoport's decision.86
On the other hand, when a court focuses on whether a trustee's
action is "reasonable," "unreasonable," "arbitrary" or "capricious" it is
probable that it is applying a more objective standard. In any event, this
standard seems to be somewhat less deferential to trustees than the sub-
jective standard, at least if one assumes that a person can fail to act
reasonably without necessarily being dishonest or fraudulent. This is il-
lustrated by Rowe v. Rowe.8 7 The case involved two identical testamen-
tary trusts that were created by Enoch and Nellie Peterson for the
benefit of Nellie's parents, George and Katherine Rowe.8 8 Wilbur
Rowe, a cousin of Nellie's, was named as trustee. 89 Under the terms of
the trust, Wilbur was authorized to pay George and Katherine "any or
all rent, income and profits [from the trust] and any or all of the princi-
pal or corpus thereof entirely according to his own judgment and discre-
tion."9 0 At the death of George and Katherine, any remaining trust
property would be paid to certain named beneficiaries. 9 '
The testators were killed in a common disaster in 1951 and their
residuary estates were conveyed to Wilbur as trustee.92 During the next
five years, the trust earned about $7500 in income, but the trustee only
distributed $600 to George and Katherine during that time.93 Eventu-
ally, George brought suit to have the trustee pay him all of the past and
future income from the trust.94 The lower court ruled that the trustee
only had discretion to apportion the income between the beneficiaries. 95
On appeal, the Oregon Supreme Court held that the trust was a
valid discretionary trust even though the testators failed to set forth a
specific standard to guide the trustee. 96 According to the court, it should
not overrule the trustee's judgment as long as he acts within the bounds
of reasonable judgment. 97 Applying these principles to the case at hand,
85 Id. at 1073.
86 Id.
87 347 P.2d 968 (Or. 1959).
88 Id. at 970.
89 Id.
90 Id.
91 Id. at 970-71.
92 Id. at 971.
93 Id.
94 Id. at 970.
95 Id. Katherine died in 1954. Id.
96 Id.
97 Id.
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the court accepted the trustee's interpretation of the trust instrument,
namely that the beneficiaries were not entitled to the trust income as a
matter of right, but rather that he should dispense income to them only
if they "lacked the essential things in life or were substantially inconve-
nienced by the lack of money." 98 In fact, the trustee had concluded that
the beneficiaries were relatively well off because of income that they
were receiving from other sources. 99 Finding that the trustee acting in
good faith in deciding to limit payments to George and Katherine, the
court found that the only question for it to decide was whether the trus-
tee's judgment was reasonable.xoo In answer to that question, it
concluded,
We are permitted to control the trustee only if we can say that
no reasonable person vested with the power which was con-
ferred upon the trustee in this case could have exercised that
power in the manner in which it was exercised. We cannot say
that the trustee's conduct in the instant case was unreasonable
in this sense. 1 '
Accordingly, the court reversed the lower court's decision and held in
favor of the trustee.102
No trust is completely mandatory. Indeed, an essential purpose of
all trusts is to enable someone, either the settlor or a third-party trustee,
to exercise judgment with respect to the administration and distribution
of the trust's assets. Furthermore, regardless of the language the settlor
chooses to use, a survey of the cases discussed above makes it clear that,
whether they apply a good faith or a reasonableness standard of review
(or a combination of both), courts will always maintain some control
over the exercise of discretion by trustees.
D. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 50(1) declares that "[a]
discretionary power conferred upon the trustee to determine the bene-
fits of a trust beneficiary is subject to judicial control only to prevent
misinterpretation or abuse of the discretion by the trustee."103 This lan-
guage, standing alone, is a fairly traditional statement of the law. How-
ever, some of the comments to this section raise some interesting points.
For example, comment b states that "[a]bsent language of extended
98 Id. at 973.
99 Id. at 973-74.
'0 Id. at 974.
101 Id.
102 Id.
103 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
Winter 2018] 243
ACTEC LAW JOURNAL
(e.g., "absolute" or "uncontrolled" discretion .. .) a court will also inter-
vene if it finds the payments made, or not made, to be unreasonable as a
means of carrying out the trust provisions." 10 4 This suggests that the de-
fault rule for measuring abuse of discretion is objective, that is, reasona-
bleness or unreasonableness, rather than one that turns on the existence
of good faith or bad faith. This interpretation dovetails with the lan-
guage of comment c, which provides that even when the trust instru-
ment uses such words as "absolute" or "unlimited" or "sole and
uncontrolled" to describe the trustee's discretion, "[t]he court will not
permit the trustee to act in bad faith or for some purpose or motive
other than to accomplish the purposes of the discretionary power."105
If this interpretation is correct, it provides a solution to two
problems. First, it sets forth a definition of abuse of discretion by which
courts may review the exercise of ordinary discretion under a reasona-
bleness standard, while reviewing the exercise of extended discretion
under a less intrusive good faith standard. Second, it strikes a balance
between the right of the settlor to define the extent of the trustee's dis-
cretion and the right of the courts to review the trustee's conduct. In
effect, by using such language as "absolute" or "uncontrolled," the set-
tlor may prohibit a court from second-guessing the reasonableness of
the trustee's exercise of discretion, while at the same time making it
clear that no language in the trust instrument can permit the trustee to
act arbitrarily or in bad faith.
Reliance Trust Company v. Candler illustrates this approach.1 06 In
that case, Claire Candler established a marital trust in 1996, under which
her husband, Buddy, was given an income interest and a limited power
of appointment.1 07 In addition, if the trustee determined that the trust
income was not sufficient to provide for Buddy's proper maintenance
and support, "such portion of the corpus of the trust estate as in the
discretion of the [t]rustee is deemed appropriate" may be paid to him.' 08
Prior to his death in 2005, Buddy exercised his power of appointment in
favor of his eight grandchildren.109 Between Claire's death in 1997 and
104 Id. § 50, cmt. b.
105 Id. § 50, cmt. c. The Uniform Trust Code contains similar language. See UNW.
TRUST CODE § 814(a) (UNw. LAW COMM'N 2010) ("Notwithstanding the breadth of dis-
cretion granted to a trustee in the terms of the trust, including the use of such terms as
'absolute', 'sole', or 'uncontrolled', the trustee shall exercise a discretionary power in
good faith and in accordance with the terms and purposes of the trust and the interests of
the beneficiaries."). See also id. § 105(b).
106 726 S.E.2d 636 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012), affd in part, rev'd in part, 751 S.E.2d 47 (Ga.
2013).
107 Id. at 638.
108 Id. at 639.
109 Id. at 638.
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Buddy's death in 2005, the trustee paid Buddy more than $1 million
from the trust corpus.11 0 After Buddy's death, his grandchildren sued
the trustee, claiming that it had breached its fiduciary duties by invading
the corpus of the trust on Buddy's behalf."' The grandchildren pre-
vailed in the lower court and the trustee appealed.112
Relying on the Restatement, the appellate court concluded that the
trustee's exercise of discretion was "infected with ... arbitrariness" and
"oppression" with respect to the grandchildren. In particular, the court
found that the trustee had treated Buddy's requests for encroachment
inconsistently and approved requests for expenses that were beyond
Buddy's yearly allotted budget." 3 In the court's view, these actions con-
stituted an abuse of discretion notwithstanding the broad grant of dis-
cretion given to the trustee by Claire in the trust instrument.114
An Illinois appellate court also relied on the Restatement to hold
that a trustee abused its discretion in Peck v. Froehlich.115 In that case,
the settlor, Marjorie Sims, created two support trusts.116 Each trust au-
thorized the trustee to distribute to her "so much of the net income and
principal of the trust as trustee believes necessary to provide for my
health, support and maintenance."" 7 After her death, the residue of the
first trust, designated as the Illinois Trust, was to be paid to the plaintiff,
James Peck, while the residue of the second trust, designated as the Ari-
zona Trust, was to be paid to the defendant, David Froehlich.118 Peck
and Froehlich were employees of the family business and were regarded
by Marjorie and her husband as the sons they never had.11 9 Marjorie
subsequently amended the Illinois Trust to make it clear that she ex-
pected the expenses of her maintenance and support should be shared
equally by the two trusts.1 2 0
Peck and Froehlich became the successor trustees of their respec-
tive trusts in 2001.121 Peck, as trustee for the Illinois Trust, assumed re-
sponsibility for Marjorie's health care. Although he sent quarterly bills
to Froehlich for one-half of Marjorie's expenses, Froehlich refused to
110 Id. at 639.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 638.
113 Id. at 641.
114 Id.
115 853 N.E.2d 927, 933 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006).
116 Id. at 929.
117 Id.
118 Id. "However, thirty percent of the Arizona Trust was to be paid to the
Fairhavens Christian Home." Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 930.
121 Id.
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pay his share. 122 After Marjorie's death, Peck sued to recover one-half
of the expenses that were paid for Marjorie's care by the Illinois
Trust.12 3 The lower court held for the defendant, declaring that "the de-
fendant had complete and total discretion as trustee in making or not
making disbursements from that Trust."1 24 However, on appeal, the Illi-
nois Appeals Court quoted from comment c to section 50 of the Re-
statement (Third) of Trusts and declared "[e]ven under the broadest
grant of fiduciary discretion, a trustee must act honestly and in a state of
mind contemplated by the settlor."1 25 The court went on the state that it
would "not permit the trustee to act in bad faith or for some purpose or
motive other than to accomplish the purposes of the discretionary
power."1 26 Given the fact that Marjorie had expressly declared that she
wanted the two trusts to share the cost of supporting her equally, the
court concluded that Froehlich was bound to carry out her wishes.1 27
Accordingly, it reversed the decision of the lower court.1 2 8
In sum, both the case law and the Restatement seem to agree that
while courts will usually defer to a trustee's judgment in close cases, they
will not tolerate conduct that is inconsistent with the purpose of the
trust or appears to be unreasonable or motivated by bad faith. Such
conduct will always be characterized as an abuse of discretion.1 2 9
III. RIGHTS OF BENEFICIARIES.
Conflicts between trustees and beneficiaries over distribution prac-
tices are all too common. Although one would expect that a broad grant
of discretionary authority would strengthen the trustee's position in
these disputes, many courts have vigorously upheld the rights of benefi-
ciaries even in the face of such expansive language.
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 Id.
125 Id. at 933.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 934.
128 Id. at 935.
129 In contrast, the Uniform Trust Code does not require that the trustee act reasona-
bly, but only that he act in good faith. See UNIF. TRUST CODE § 814(a) (UNIF. LAW
COMM'N 2010); see also William M. McGovern, Sheldon F. Kurtz & David M. English,
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 9.7 at 405 (4th ed. 2001).
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A. Support Trusts.
A support trust provides that income from the trust,13 0 or part of
the principal, is to be used for the "support" of a named beneficiary. 13 1
Some support trusts are mandatory in the sense that the trustee must
distribute funds to the beneficiary if he concludes that the beneficiary is
in need of financial assistance. In other cases, the trust instrument allows
the trustee to decide whether or not to distribute funds to a beneficiary
who qualifies for support from the trust.1 32 This latter type of trust is
sometimes referred to as a "discretionary support trust." 3 3 With the
first type of trust, the trustee exercises judgment as to whether the bene-
ficiary has demonstrated sufficient need to qualify for support from the
trust. Then, the trustee must determine how much support is appropri-
ate. 134 With the second type of trust, the trustee must first decide
whether to make any distribution from the trust before deciding the
other two questions. In theory, judicial review should be more limited
when the second type of support trust is involved.
Sometimes, it is not clear from the trust instrument how much dis-
cretion the trustee actually has. For example, in In re Greenleaf's Es-
tate,135 Mr. Greenleaf's will established a trust for the benefit of his wife,
Annie.1 36 Annie was to receive $60 per month for life.' 3 7 In addition,
the trust declared that if Annie, "by reason of sickness or other good
cause," needed additional funds, the trustee was directed to provide her
with enough money to ensure for her "support, comfort and needs to
the end that she shall be fully and properly cared for and provided
for."1 3 8 After Greenleaf's death, Annie petitioned the court to authorize
the trustee to raise her allowance to $300 per month and pay her an
additional $3000 for various expenses.1 39 The court granted this request
over the trustee's objections.1 40 Two years later, Annie, now 77 years
old, sought to obtain an additional $4500 from the trust to pay for home
130 See, e.g., In re Estate of Charles E. Ward, 69 N.W.2d 187, 188 (Mich. 1955).
131 See Evelyn Ginsberg Abravanel, Discretionary Support Trusts, 68 IowA L. REV.
273, 278 (1983).
132 See Auchincloss v. City Bank Farmers Tr. Co., 70 A.2d 105, 105 (Conn. 1949); In
re Rachlin's Will, 133 N.Y.S.2d 151, 152 (Sur. Ct. 1954).
133 See Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Neb., N.A., 615 N.W.2d 104, 106 (Neb. 2000);
Smith v. Smith, 517 N.W.2d 394, 398 (Neb. 1994).
134 See Bos. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Johnson, 96 N.E.2d 155, 156 (Mass. 1951); In re
Hilton, 160 N.Y.S. 55, 55 (App. Div. 1916); Huntington Nat'l Bank v. Aladdin Crippled
Children's Hosp. Ass'n, Inc., 157 N.E.2d 138, 139-40 (Ohio Ct. App. 1959).
135 225 P.2d 945 (Cal. Ct. App. 1951).
136 Id. at 946.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 946-47.
139 Id. at 947.
140 Id.
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improvements and a new automobile.1 4 1 This request was also granted
and the trustee again appealed.1 42
The trustee argued that since the trustee had the discretion to de-
termine how much money should be paid to Annie, the court had no
authority to override its finding that $200 per month was sufficient to
maintain her in accordance with the standards prescribed by the testa-
tor.14 3 However, the court noted that the testator declared that "I direct
my Trustee to use and apply sufficient of the income and principal .. . so
that my said wife shall have sufficient money to provide for her support,
comfort and needs to the end that she shall be fully and properly cared
for and provided for."144 In the court's view, this was not a matter of
discretion and the trustee was required to provide additional funds for
her support once the widow demonstrated a need for such funds.1 45
Trust beneficiaries are not shy about turning to the courts for relief
when they disagree with a particular exercise of the trustee's discretion.
Sometimes they are successful and sometimes they are not. Further-
more, each case is fact specific and it is difficult to identify any pattern in
these wins and losses, although it is probably safe to say that courts will
generally uphold a trustee's decision unless its conduct is suspicious or
manifestly unreasonable.
For example, in Rogers v. Munsey,146 Imogen Cooke created a trust
in 1927 for the benefit of her daughter, Alberta, who was insane.147 The
original trustee, George Munsey, was authorized to expend trust funds
"for the benefit of my said daughter in such manner and at such times as
he shall deem proper, using either income or principal for the pleasure,
comfort and support of my said daughter."1 48 Munsey filed periodic ac-
counts until his death in 1954, but no guardian ad litem was ever ap-
pointed to represent Alberta's interest during this time.149 However,
Munsey also served as Alberta's guardian from 1925 until his death.o5 0
Munsey's son, Everett was appointed successor trustee and Charles
Rogers was appointed Alberta's guardian in 1954.151
Shortly after his appointment as Alberta's guardian, Rogers filed a
petition requesting the probate court to reopen twenty-three accounts
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id. at 949.
145 Id.
146 164 A.2d 554 (N.H. 1960)
147 Id. at 554-55.
148 Id. at 555.
149 See id.
150 See id. at 554-55.
151 See id. at 555.
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filed by the elder Munsey between 1927 and 1954.152 The purpose of this
action was to compel the successor trustee to reimburse Alberta for
"such sum as is reasonable toward the support" of Alberta from 1927 to
1954.153 According to Rogers, Alberta would have been able to chal-
lenge to the trustee's decision to accumulate income if .she had been
represented by a guardian ad litem. The validity of this argument, in
turn, depended on whether the trustee should have distributed all of the
trust's income to Alberta during this period or whether he was author-
ized to retain some of it to add to the trust principal.154
Finding that Imogen's will permitted the trustee "hold" trust in-
come as well as to "use" or "expend" it, the court upheld the trustee's
actions:
We conclude that the life beneficiary was entitled to receive
only so much of the income or principal as the trustee in the
reasonable exercise of his discretion should determine. Fraud
or misrepresentation is not alleged in the petition and there is
nothing in the record to indicate that Alberta has not received
the "pleasure, comfort and support" to which she was entitled
under her mother's will.' 55
Consequently, the court held that the Guardian's petition should not be
granted.1 56
More recently, an Illinois intermediate appellate court also upheld
a trustee's exercise of discretion against a claim by the income benefi-
ciaries that their stepmother, Deborah Alley and J.P. Morgan Chase
Bank, the co-trustees of several trusts created by their father, William
Alley, had abused their discretion by not distributing more of the trust
income to them.1 57 Each of the trusts provided that the trustees shall
pay "so much of the net income as the trustees shall deem advisable for
the proper care, support, maintenance or education of such daughter of
the grantor and such daughter's issue."' 58 The plaintiffs' trusts were fur-
ther subdivided into GST exempt and GST non-exempt trusts.1 59 After
William's death, the trustees adopted a distribution schedule under
152 See id.
153 Id.
154 See id. at 556.
155 Id.
156 See id.
157 See Laubner v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 898 N.E.2d 744, 747 (Ill. App. Ct.
2008).
158 Id. at 748.
159 Id. at 747.
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which two of the beneficiaries, Patricia Laubner and Pamela Larson,
received $11,500 per month or 3.5% of the value of the trust assets.160
In 2007, Patricia and Pamela petitioned the court to modify the
trust agreement to allow a distribution to them of 5% of the fair market
value of the trust assets. 161 They subsequently requested the trial court
to remove Deborah as trustee and appoint them as trustees of their re-
spective trusts. 162 The plaintiffs alleged that the trustees had breached
their fiduciary duties by showing a preference for the remainder benefi-
ciaries instead of focusing more on the their comfortable maintenance
and support, by adopting arbitrary distribution standards and by sub-
jecting the plaintiffs' descendants to potential generation-skipping taxes
by not depleting the non-exempt trusts first.163
On appeal, the court considered whether the distribution formula
was arbitrary.1 64 The plaintiffs contended that the 3.5% rate was too low
because it reflected a desire to preserve the trust principal instead of
providing the income beneficiaries with sufficient funds to maintain
their current lifestyles.1 65 However, the court held that the plaintiffs had
not set forth any facts to show why the amount currently distributed to
them was not sufficient for them to maintain a comfortable lifestyle.166
Finally, the court declared that the trustees had not breached their duty
of impartiality by improperly favoring the remainder beneficiaries.1 6 7
A New York appellate court reached a similar conclusion in the
case of In re Trusts for McDonald.6 8 In that case, two 19-year-old twin
sisters attempted to remove their mother as trustee of two testamentary
trusts created by their grandfather.1 69 This action was precipitated by
the refusal of the trustee to make discretionary distributions from the
trusts to pay for their college expenses and the purchase of automobiles
for each of them.1 70 The trusts authorized the trustee to "pay or apply to
or for the use of each living grandchild of mine so much of the income,
accumulated income and principal of such share at any time and from
time to time as the Trustee deems advisable in [the Trustee's] sole dis-
cretion not subject to judicial review, to provide for such grandchild's
160 Id. at 748.
161 See id. at 748-49.
162 Id. at 749.
163 Id.
164 See id. at 750.
165 See id. at 750-51.
166 Id. at 752.
167 Id. at 751-52.
168 953 N.Y.S.2d 751, 753-754 (App. Div. 2012).
169 Id. at 752.
170 Id.
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maintenance, support, education, health and welfare, even to the point
of exhausting the same."' 71
The trustee appealed the Surrogate Court's ruling that she had
abused her discretion by rejecting her daughters' request.172 On appeal,
the court acknowledged that the testator "manifested a clear intention
to grant the trustee the greatest latitude permitted by law in exercising
discretionary judgment,"1 73 but nevertheless reversed the lower
court. 1 7 4 The court held that its review of the exercise of the trustee's
judgment in making discretionary distributions should be evaluated in
light of other resources that might be available to the beneficiaries. 7 5 In
this case, the court found that college savings accounts were available to
pay for the plaintiffs' college expenses.' 76 Although the court did not
specifically address the question of whether the trustee could be re-
quired to purchase automobiles for her daughters, it tacitly upheld the
trustee's decision on that issue as well.
While courts are often inclined to dismiss challenges to the exercise
of discretion by a trustee, this is not always the case. Thus, in Conlin v.
Murdock,'77 the New Jersey Chancery Court upheld the claim of a ben-
eficiary.178 In the Conlin case, John Armstrong's will left his residuary
estate in trust and authorized his trustees to pay over the income from
the trust, together with such portions of the principal as the trustees "in
their, his or its absolute discretion think proper" to Armstrong's sisters,
Georgina, Eva and Elizabeth, and to his brother, Wilfred, "in such re-
spective shares and proportions, whether equal or unequal, as my said
trustees may in their, his or its discretion think proper, for their support
and maintenance."1 7 9 There was also a remainder to Armstrong's nieces
at the death of the last income beneficiary.180 The testator named Wil-
fred and Eva as executors and trustees.181
The plaintiff, Georgina, alleged that she was "seventy-three years
of age, crippled, destitute, without means of support" and in need of
constant medical care and attention.1 82 Furthermore, Georgina claimed
that she was wholly dependent on her daughter, Hazel, who earned a
171 Id. at 753.
172 Id. at 752.
173 Id. at 753.
174 Id. at 754.
175 Id. at 753-54.
176 Id. at 754.
177 43 A.2d 218 (N.J. Ch. 1945).
178 Id. at 220.
179 Id. at 219.
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id.
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modest salary.183 She also contended that the trustees only paid her $50
per month from the trust, the same amount that Eva and Wilfred re-
ceived.184 In response, Frank Gordon, one of the trustees, admitted that
the monthly allowance was not sufficient to provide Georgina with ade-
quate support. 85 Nevertheless, he argued that the $50 per month pay-
ment to Georgina was justified because that was the amount Wilfred
and Eva received.1 86
The court was not impressed with Frank's reasoning. Instead, it de-
clared that even the use of such terms as "absolute" or "uncontrolled"
would not give a trustee unlimited discretion.' 87 Instead, a trustee would
be guilty of an abuse of discretion if the court concludes that he is "pay-
ing less than a reasonable person could think necessary for the benefici-
ary's support."s88 Applying this standard, the court determined,
Considering Georgina's circumstances, the monthly allowance
to her is entirely inadequate for her support and manifestly not
in accord with the testator's clear intent. It is just a mere pit-
tance that will not meet the cost of the bare necessities of life.
The complainant Georgina must not only have food, be
clothed and housed, but her condition is such that she requires
constant medical attention. These absolute requirements entail
a cost very much in excess of the amount the executor-trustees
advance. 189
The court then ruled that the parties could try to agree upon a reasona-
ble monthly allowance for Georgina; if they failed to do so, the court
declared that it would appoint a master to decide the issue.1 90
Stallard v. Johnson'9 1 provides another example of judicial overrul-
ing of parsimonious trustees. In that case, Frederick Stallard's will
declared,
I direct my trustee to expend from time to time so much of the
income and of the principal of said trust estate as shall seem
meet and proper for the comfort, maintenance and support of
my beloved wife, Sadie E. Stallard, and my beloved sister, Ella
Stallard Johnson, for and during the period of their natural
lives, with full power and authority to sell and dispose of so
183 Id.
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 Id.
187 Id.
188 Id. at 220 (quoting 2 Scorr ON TRUSTS § 187-2, at 993).
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 116 P.2d 965 (Okla. 1941).
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much of my estate, both real and personal, as is necessary if the
income therefrom is not sufficient to properly care, support
and provide for my said wife and sister during their lifetime in
a manner which my trustee shall deem suitable . 192
The trustee maintained that this language gave him the absolute power
to determine how much, and in what manner, maintenance and care
should be provided on behalf of the beneficiaries. 193 Accordingly, the
trustee limited the plaintiff's allowance to $15 per month and refused to
pay for any other expenses such as board, lodging, medical care,
medicine, clothing or incidental expenses. 194 For her part, the plaintiff
alleged without contradiction, that she was more than seventy-two years
old and suffered from the infirmities of age and from a heart condition
that required medical attention and treatment.1 9 5 She claimed that the
amount provided to her by the trustee "was wholly inadequate to meet
the reasonable and ordinary expenses of the plaintiff or to provide her
with common necessities of life."1 96 According to the plaintiff, a reason-
able allowance would have been $75 per month.1 97
The trial court ruled that the trustee had abused his discretion and
directed him to pay the plaintiff $60 per month. 9 8 On appeal, the court
rejected the trustee's assertion that any interference by the court with
his discretion was not permissible.1 99 Instead, the court declared that
"the discretion vested in a trustee must be fairly and reasonably exer-
cised and if not the same will be compelled by a court of equity." 200 In
other words, "courts in the exercise of their equitable jurisdiction have
the power and duty of safeguarding the rights of the cestui que trust and
of compelling the performance by the trustee of the duties of his
trust." 2 0 1 In this case, the court concluded that where the trust had suffi-
cient assets to carry out the testator's avowed purpose of providing his
wife and sister with suitable care and maintenance, the manifestly inade-
quate allowance provided by the trustee "constituted an exercise of the
discretion vested in the defendant as trustee [that] would constitute
travesty upon justice and be cause for righteous reproach of the
192 Id. at 966.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Id.
199 Id. at 967.
200 Id.
201 Id. (citing Hull v. Holloway, 20 A. 445 (Conn. 1889)).
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courts." 2 0 2 Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the lower
court.203
It is worth noting that not all "support" trusts are concerned with
providing maintenance or support. In some cases, the trust purpose may
be expressed in broader terms, such as "benefit," "happiness" 204 "con-
venience" 205 or "welfare," leaving the trustee to determine exactly what
these words mean. On the other hand, settlors sometimes seek to limit
payments from the trust to such purposes as educational expenses 206 or
providing for casualties 207 or other emergencies. 208 Because these terms
are inherently vague, trustees must often exercise discretion when ad-
ministering trusts of this nature. Educational trusts provide some inter-
esting examples of this.
In Wolf's Estate,209 the decedent's will authorized the trustee to
"apply the income or as much of the principal as the said trustee in his
opinion he shall deem necessary, for the proper education of my
brother, Daniel B. Wolf." 2 1 0 The decedent's widow was named as the
residuary legatee.211 A question arose as to whether a "proper educa-
tion" was limited to a formal education, which would normally end upon
graduation from college, or whether it referred to education in the
broad sense, a process that might continue throughout Daniel's life-
time. 212 The court concluded that the decedent used the term "educa-
tion" in its broader sense and ruled that the widow would have to wait
until Daniel died before she could get possession of the trust
property. 213
In contrast, the court in Epstein v. Kuvin214 viewed the concept of
education more narrowly. In that case, Fannie Kuvin's will directed that
her sons Samuel and Herbert were to contribute $600 and $400 a year
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 See, e.g., Hartford Nat'1 Bank & Tr. Co. v. Turner, 156 A.2d 800, 801 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1959); Combs v. Carey's Tr., 287 S.W.2d 443, 444 (Ky. 1955).
205 See, e.g., Bos. Safe Deposit & Tr. Co. v. Stebbins, 34 N.E.2d 616, 617 (Mass. 1941).
206 See, e.g., New Britain Tr. Co. v. Stoddard, 179 A. 642, 642 (Conn. 1935); Sec'y Tr.
Co. v. Smith, 145 S.W.2d 512, 513 (Ky. 1940); Epstein v. Kuvin, 95 A.2d 753, 753 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 1953); In re Egan's Estate, 39 N.Y.S.2d 96, 97 (Sur. Ct. 1942); In re
Wolfe's Estate, 299 N.Y.S. 99, 100 (Sur. Ct. 1937).
207 See, e.g., Pyne v. Payne, 40 N.W.2d 682, 683 (Neb. 1950).
208 See, e.g., In re Tone's Estate, 39 N.W.2d 401, 403 (Iowa 1949); Lyter v. Vestal, 196
S.W.2d 769, 770 (Mo. 1946); In re Shiel's Will, 120 N.Y.S.2d 632, 635 (Sur. Ct. 1953).
209 299 N.Y.S. at 99.
210 Id. at 100.
211 Id.
212 Id. at 100-02.
213 Id. at 101-02.
214 95 A.2d 753 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1953).
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respectively toward the expenses of a college education for her grand-
son, Sanford Kuvin.215 Fannie's sons made the required contributions
until their nephew completed his four-year undergraduate studies but
balked at paying for an additional four years of medical school.216 On
appeal, the court reversed the trial court and declared,
[W]e believe that the great majority of people, when they say
that this member of the family or that acquaintance had a col-
lege education or has a college degree, mean that he has taken
a regular course of study on the undergraduate level that is
open to students coming directly from high school; and that he
has been awarded the bachelor's degree to which the course
leads, and so completed his college education. 217
Accordingly, the court held that Fannie did not mean the term "college
education" to include medical school.218
B. Pure Discretionary Trusts.
A pure discretionary trust exists when the trustee's power to dis-
tribute trust assets is not subject to any sort of objective standard.219
Since there is no standard by which a trustee's decision can be evalu-
ated, beneficiaries are often said to have a mere expectancy rather than
a specific legal interest in the trust assets.220 For this reason, it is often
said that a beneficiary cannot compel the trustee to exercise his discre-
tion in any particular way.
As the Ternansky case demonstrates,221 courts tend to uphold the
trustee's judgment in such cases. In her will, Rose Ternansky left two-
thirds of her residuary estate outright to two of her three children and
directed that the remaining third be held in trust for the benefit of her
third child, William. 222 The trustee, William's sister, Florence, was au-
thorized to pay over to William "the whole or any part of the corpus ...
at such time or times, and in such amount or amounts, as said trustee
may deem advisable." 223 Although an Ohio appeals court found that
215 Id. at 753.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 754.
218 Id.
219 See Henderson v. Collins, 267 S.E.2d 202, 206 (Ga. 1980); In re Leona Carlisle Tr.,
498 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Kolpack v. Torres, 829 S.W.2d 913, 915 (Tex.
App. 1992).
220 See, e.g., In re Nicholson's Estate, 50 A.2d 283, 285 (Pa. 1947); In re Lochrie's
Estate, 16 A.2d 133, 137 (Pa. 1940).
221 See In re Estate of Ternansky, 141 N.E.2d 189, 193 (Ohio Ct. App. 1957).
222 Id. at 190.
223 Id.
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William was the sole equitable owner of the trust assets,224 it rejected
William's claim that he was entitled to the trust corpus.225 In the court's
view,
Trustees must always act in good faith and always act fairly and
reasonably, and a court of equity will and can require such [be-
havior]. Where a trustee is given uncontrolled discretion, as
here, he acts much as a judicial officer and is duty bound to
exercise sound discretion under the circumstances.226
In addition, the court declared that,
Generally, such a power is limited to the extent at least that a
trustee is bound to act in good faith and with due care, dili-
gence and skill. The discretion of trustees may be likened to
that of judges. It is not an arbitrary discretion and does not
include the unrestrained power to do what the trustee
pleases.227
Accordingly, the court held that, subject to the standard set forth above,
Florence could determine when and whether William should receive any
disbursements from the trust.228 However, since there was no remain-
derman, any funds remaining in the trust at William's death would be-
come part of his estate.
A similar decision was also upheld by a Minnesota appeals court in
Hurtig v. Gabrielson.229 That case involved a pourover trust established
by the beneficiary's father. The trust provided that the trustee, the bene-
ficiary's brother, could distribute any part of the net income from the
trust "to or among the donor's children in any proportion deemed advis-
able by the Trustee." 230 The trustee made distributions each year to the
testator's children, but deducted from Joan Hurtig's share the interest
on a $50,000 bank loan which her father had cosigned and which the
bank had collected from his estate. 231 As a result, Joan received virtually
nothing.232 Joan contended that the trustee's action was improper be-
cause her debt to the estate had been discharged by bankruptcy. 2 3 3
Reversing the lower court, the appellate court concluded that the
"trustee has absolute discretion to make or withhold . . . distributions;
224 Id. at 191.
225 Id. at 193.
226 Id. at 192.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 193.
229 525 N.W.2d 612 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995).
230 Id. at 613.
231 Id.
232 Id.
233 Id.
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his decision to apply respondent's distributions . . . to her debt to the
estate was also within his discretion." 2 3 4 Finding that there was no abuse
of discretion, the court upheld the trustee's discretion to offset distribu-
tions to Joan by the interest owed on her debt to the estate. 235
On the other hand, a court is more likely to intervene when a trus-
tee flatly refuses to consider making a distribution to a beneficiary.
Thus, in Rinker's Administrator v. Simpson,2 36 Ella Rinker created a tes-
tamentary trust for the benefit of Nina Garrison, naming her sister Lil-
lian White and Lillian's husband, Brock White, as trustees. 237 In her
will, Ella authorized the Whites to hold $1000 in trust for Nina, using
both principal and interest "entirely as they deem best for her." 238 De-
spite the fact that Nina alleged that "she was in the hospital, physically
helpless, and without means to meet her necessary expenses for mainte-
nance and medical and hospital attention," the trustees steadfastly re-
fused to distribute trust funds to her.239 The lower court overruled the
trustees' demurrer and they appealed.240 The Virginia Supreme Court
acknowledged that the trustees had "wide discretion" to determine
when and in what amounts they would make payments to Nina.24 1 Nev-
ertheless, this discretion was not unlimited. According to the court,
The discretion given to them by the will is not the uncontrolled
right to choose whether they will or will not expend any part of
the trust for her benefit, but the right to decide in the exercise
of an honest judgment when and to what extent they shall
make payments to or for [Nina] to accomplish the purpose of
the trust, i.e., promote her best interest. 242
The court concluded by declaring that the will imposed upon the trust-
ees a positive duty to exercise their discretion in good faith in order to
achieve the testator's purpose.243
When a trustee is given the discretion to invade the corpus of the
trust, the question sometimes arises as to whether he may distribute the
entire corpus to a beneficiary and thereby terminate the trust in re-
sponse to a request from a beneficiary. Clearly, the trustee can do so if
234 Id. at 614.
235 Id.
236 166 S.E. 546 (Va. 1932).
237 Id. at 547-48.
238 Id. at 547.
239 Id. at 548.
240 Id.
241 Id. at 549.
242 Id.
243 Id.
Winter 2018] 257
ACTEC LAW JOURNAL
the trust instrument expressly empowers him to do so.244 However,
while a trustee may be given the power to transfer the entire corpus of
the trust to one of the beneficiaries, it is clear that a beneficiary cannot
compel him to do so when the power is discretionary. 245 Woodard v.
Mordecai2 4 6 provides a good illustration of this principle. Woodard in-
volved a testamentary trust for the benefit of the testator's wife, son and
daughter. 247 Each of the three beneficiaries was entitled to receive the
income from the trust.2 4 8 In addition, the will provided that the trustees
(if they in their judgment deem it necessary or best for the wel-
fare of the cestui que trust, and consistent with the welfare of
my family and estate) may from time to time, advance, deliver
and convey absolutely and in fee simple, free from the trust, [to
the beneficiaries] any part or all of the share of the corpus of
the trust estate above provided for his or her benefit and thus
terminate the trust so far as it affects the property so advanced,
delivered or conveyed ... 249
The testator's widow, Elizabeth, and his daughter, Bessie, re-
quested the trustees to transfer their respective shares to them free of
trust.2 5 0 The corporate trustee was willing to comply with this request
but the individual trustee refused to do so. 2 5 1 Thereupon, the widow and
daughter brought an action against the individual trustee to compel him
to consent to the termination of their interests in the trust.2 5 2 The trial
court ruled in favor of the defendant trustee.2 53 On appeal, the North
Carolina court acknowledged that while a court could compel a trustee
to exercise a mandatory power, it could not intervene in the exercise of
a discretionary power except to prevent an abuse of discretion. 2 5 4 Ac-
cording to the court, a trustee would only abuse his discretion "if he acts
dishonestly, or if he acts with an improper motive even though not a
244 See Lees v. Howorth, 131 A.2d 229, 232 (R.I. 1957). But see, e.g., Corkery v. Dor-
sey, 111 N.E. 795, 797 (Mass. 1916).
245 See, e.g., Boyden v. Stevens, 188 N.E. 741, 743 (Mass. 1934); Woodard v.
Mordecai, 67 S.E.2d 639, 645 (N.C. 1951); but see In re Kaminester's Will, 184 N.Y.S.2d
237, 239-240 (Sur. Ct. 1959).
246 67 S.E.2d 639 (N.C. 1951).
247 See id. at 640.
248 Id. at 641.
249 Id. at 642.
250 Id. at 643.
251 Id.
252 Id.
253 Id. at 644.
254 Id.
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dishonest motive, or if he fails to use his judgment, or if he acts beyond
the bounds of reasonable judgment." 2 5 5
In this case, the widow contended that the trustee should terminate
the trust in order to "free her from 'court struggles' and restore her
piece of mind." 2 5 6 The individual trustee apparently did not consider
this to be a sufficient reason for terminating the trust. The appeals court
agreed and affirmed the trial court's decision, while pointing out that its
judgment did not preclude the trustees from complying with the benefi-
ciaries' wishes at some later time.2 5 7
Notwithstanding the fact that the beneficiaries of a purely discre-
tionary trust cannot compel the trustee to make a distribution of trust
funds to them, they may compel the trustee to render an accounting 258
and they also have standing to request a court to surcharge or remove
the trustee for breach of fiduciary duty.259 The right to an accounting is
illustrated by Goodpasteur v. Fried.260 The plaintiff, Ralph Goodpas-
teur, one of four income beneficiaries of a discretionary trust established
under the will of Reverend Clarence Cobbs, brought suit to require the
trustees to provide an accounting of the trust assets. 261 The trial court
dismissed the suit because the plaintiff failed to allege misconduct on
the part of the trustees. 2 6 2 On appeal, the court observed that Section 11
of the Trust and Trustees Act of Illinois required a trustee to provide
annually an accounting to all beneficiaries "then entitled to receive or
eligible to have the benefit" of any income from the trust.263 The trust-
ees maintained that the plaintiff's interest in the trust was a mere expec-
tancy and only the First Church of Deliverance, the remainder
beneficiary, was entitled to an accounting. 264 However, the court held
that Ralph was an eligible beneficiary even though the trust was discre-
tionary and, therefore, was entitled to demand an accounting.2 6 5
Moreover, as Scanlan v. Eisenberg2 6 6 points out, the beneficiary of
a discretionary trust also has standing to seek relief against a trustee for
255 Id.
256 Id. at 646.
257 Id.
258 See Goodpasteur v. Fried, 539 N.E.2d 207, 210 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Rinker's Ad-
ministrator v. Simpson, 166 S.E. 546, 549 (Va. 1932).
259 See Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2012); Fortune v. First Union
Nat'1 Bank, 371 S.E.2d 483, 485 (N.C. 1988); see also In re Jacobs, 370 S.E.2d 860, 863
(N.C. Ct. App. 1988).
260 539 N.E.2d 207 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989).
261 Id. at 208.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 209.
264 Id. at 210.
265 Id.
266 669 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2012).
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breach of fiduciary duty. The plaintiff in that case, Mary Scanlan, was
the principal beneficiary of six trusts established by her father and un-
cle.2 6 7 Each of the trusts authorized the trustee to distribute "all or as
much of the net income or principal, or both" to Mary "as the Trustee
deems to be necessary for her support" or "in her best interests." 268
Mary's children were the trust's contingent remainder beneficiaries.269
Mary brought suit, alleging that the corporate trustee, General Trust Co.
and its majority owner, Marshall Eisenberg, failed to properly diversify
the trust's assets, which largely consisted of General Growth Properties
(GGP) stock, and, in fact, purchased even more GGP stock in 2007 and
2008.270 As a result, the trusts incurred more than $200 million in losses
when GGP declared bankruptcy in 2009.271 She also claimed that trust-
ees' actions were tainted by a conflict of interest.2 7 2
Finding that the trusts' assets totaled approximately $800 million,273
the trial court ruled that Mary lacked standing because she failed to
allege "facts showing a likelihood that the corpus of the trusts would
ever be insufficient to pay all of her discretionary distributions to which
[she] might become entitled during her lifetime." 274 Reversing the trial
court's decision, the federal appeals court relied on section 94(1) of the
Third Restatement of Trusts, which provides,
A suit against a trustee of a private trust to enjoin or redress a
breach of trust or otherwise to enforce the trust may be main-
tained only by a beneficiary or by a co-trustee, successor trus-
tee, or other person acting on behalf of one or more
beneficiaries. 275
In addition, the court observed that comment b to section 94 declared,
A suit to enforce a private trust ordinarily .-. . may be main-
tained by any beneficiary whose rights are or may be adversely
affected by the matter(s) at issue. The beneficiaries of a trust
include any person who holds a beneficial, present or future,
vested or contingent [interest].. . . This includes a person who
is eligible to receive a discretionary distribution. . . .276
267 Id. at 840.
268 Id.
269 Id.
270 Id.
271 Id. at 840-41.
272 Id. at 841.
273 Id. at 842.
274 Id. at 841.
275 See RESTATEMENT (THIR) OF TRUSTS § 94(1) (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
276 Id. § 94, cmt. b.
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Based on its interpretation of the Restatement, as well as other authori-
ties,277 the court concluded that Mary had an equitable interest in the
trust and, therefore, had standing to enforce the trust.278
C. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts.
The Restatement (Third) of Trusts sets forth the rights of the trust
beneficiaries and the power of the courts to grant relief against the
abuse of a trustee's discretion. Section 50(2) provides,
[t]he benefits to which a beneficiary of a discretionary interest
is entitled, and what may constitute an abuse of discretion by
the trustee, depend on the terms of the discretion, including
the proper construction of any accompanying standards, and
on the settlor's purposes in granting discretionary power and in
creating the trust.2 7 9
This formulation is not particularly novel or controversial. How-
ever, several comments to section 50(2) provide some additional con-
text, at least where support trusts are concerned. For example, comment
d, which discusses the meaning of frequently used standards, points out
that the terms "maintenance" and "support" mean essentially the same
thing.280 In addition, these terms usually imply a level of support from
the trust sufficient to enable the beneficiary to maintain his or her accus-
tomed standard of living.281 Comment d also declares that distributions
appropriate to the beneficiary's present lifestyle may require an increase
from the trustee, not only to compensate for inflation, but also to pre-
vent the beneficiary's standard of living from deteriorating due to medi-
cal expenses or the expense of providing for the needs of others.282
Furthermore, in the absence of language suggesting a broader standard
of support, the terms "support" and "maintenance" would not include
payments that are unrelated to support but merely contribute to other
aspects of the beneficiary's contentment or happiness. 283
Comment d also considers the effect of such terms as "comfort,"
"welfare" or "happiness" on the size of a distribution to the beneficiary
of a support trust.284 It concludes that the term "comfort" does not
277 See In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152, 1157 (Colo. 1991); United States v.
O'Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574, 577 (Minn. 1994); Paulson v. Paulson, 783 N.W.2d 262,
272 (N.D. 2010).
278 Scanlan v. Eisenberg, 669 F.3d 838, 843 (7th Cir. 2012).
279 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50(2).
280 Id. § 50(2), cmt. d.
281 Id.
282 Id.
283 Id.
284 Id.
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change the meaning of maintenance and support for a beneficiary whose
lifestyle is already reasonably comfortable, although it might be inter-
preted to raise the level of support for a beneficiary whose lifestyle is
more modest.2 8 5 On the other hand, comment d also suggests that a pro-
vision that authorizes distributions for the "benefit," "best interests" or
"welfare" of a beneficiary might be construed to allow the trustee to
make distributions that exceed a purely support-related standard.286 Fi-
nally, comment d states that use of the term "happiness" indicates an
intent provide even more generously for the beneficiary. 287
Comment e is concerned with the issue of whether a trustee may or
must take other resources available to a beneficiary into account when
making a distribution from a support trust.288 Comment e creates a pre-
sumption, subject to certain qualifications, that the trustee should take
these resources into account in determining whether, and in what
amounts, a distribution is to be made.28 9 That being said, comment e
also notes that this presumption should not apply when the settlor ex-
presses a contrary intent or where such a presumption would be con-
trary to the purposes or terms of the trust.2" In addition, the Reporter's
Notes acknowledge that this presumption is a departure from previous
Restatements, 291 but point out that it appears to be consistent with the
modern trend of judicial decisions. 292
Finally, comment f sets forth a number of inferences and construc-
tional preferences to aid the trustee when there are multiple benefi-
ciaries or groups who may be entitled to discretionary distributions.293
For example, the beneficiary's relationship to the settlor may be rele-
vant.2 9 4 In addition, where multiple lines of descent are involved, it may
be appropriate to make distributions on a per stirpes basis.295 Finally,
where the beneficiaries are of the same generation, such as children fol-
lowing the death of one or both parents, comment f suggests that the
distribution scheme reflect a preference for a common standard of living
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 Id.
288 Id. § 50(2), cmt. e.
289 Id.
290 Id.
291 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 128 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 1959).
292 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50, Reporter's Notes (AM. LAW INST.
2003).
293 Id. sec. 50, cmt. f.
294 Id.
295 Id.
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and similarity of opportunity, assuming similar needs, capacities and
interests. 296
IV. RIGHTS OF CREDITORS.
Creditors include children and ex-spouses of a beneficiary seeking
child support or alimony, providers of necessary goods and services like
physicians or hospitals, ordinary business creditors like banks or credit
card companies, tort claimants and government agencies seeking pay-
ment for back taxes or government services. While these creditors can
always seek to recover directly against the beneficiary, they often prefer
to force the trustee to pay their claims from the trust assets rather than
taking their chances with wily deadbeats. The ability of such creditors to
recover against the trust itself depends on the status of the claimant and
the nature of the beneficiary's interest in the trust. 2 9 7
A. Support Trusts.
In theory, most creditors should not be able to force the trustee of a
support trust to pay them because this would not ordinarily be consis-
tent with the purposes of the trust. However, most courts will allow cer-
tain creditors to seek payment from the trust. This includes ex-spouses
and minor children of the beneficiary as well as government health care
providers.
1. Ordinary Creditors.
Since the trustee of a support trust is only authorized to distribute
funds to provide a beneficiary with funds for maintenance and support,
neither the beneficiary nor creditors of the beneficiary can compel the
trustee to make distributions for other purposes since such payments
would be contrary to the purposes of the trust.2 98 On the other hand, it
may be possible for a provider of necessary goods and services to seek
compensation from the trustee of a support trust.299 The Estate of
Dodge case provides a good example of this principle. 3 M In that case,
Eleanor Paine brought suit against the trustee of a support trust for re-
296 Id.
297 Creditors may also be defeated by the presence of a spendthrift provision. A
spendthrift provision is a restraint on a beneficiary's power to alienate his interest in the
trust, either voluntarily or involuntarily. See Schreiber v. Kellogg, 50 F.3d 264, 267 (3d
Cir. 1995); First Nw. Tr. Co. of S.D. v. Internal Revenue Serv., 622 F.2d 387, 391 (8th Cir.
1980); In re Watts, 162 P.2d 82, 87 (Kan. 1945).
298 See GEORGE T. BOGERT, TRUSTS § 42 (6th ed.1987).
299 See Strojek v. Harden Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1999).
300 281 N.W.2d 447 (Iowa 1979).
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imbursement for nursing home care, medical bills, hospital expenses and
other expenses that she had paid on behalf of her sister, Margaret Bow-
ers, who suffered from mental illness and required full-time care in a
rest home.301 The trust in question was established by their aunt,
Carolyn Dodge, and was administered by their brother, Hunter Scott.3 02
The trust granted Hunter "the right to disburse or use any portion of the
principal for the care and maintenance" of the beneficiary, Margaret.303
When Hunter refused to invade the trust corpus in order to repay Elea-
nor, she brought suit to force him to do so. 3 0 4
The lower court ruled that the trust must reimburse Eleanor for the
expenditures she made for Margaret's care prior to her death in 1976.305
This decision was affirmed on appeal. 306 The appeals court first con-
cluded that the trust was a support trust, not a purely discretionary
one.30 7 Furthermore, relying on section 157 of the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Trusts, the court agreed that the interest of the beneficiary could
be reached to satisfy a claim in the case of a support trust.3 08 Accord-
ingly, the court held that Eleanor could recover from the trust if "the
claim is for necessary goods or services, not officiously rendered, which
the settlor intended to be provided the beneficiary by trust funds; and
(2) the withholding of payment for the goods and services is not prop-
erly within the discretion granted the trustee by the instrument." 3 0 9 The
court offered the following rationale to support its conclusion:
To bar this claim for necessary services rendered the deceased
beneficiary would unjustly enrich the trust corpus at the ex-
pense of the creditor, a result contrary to the intent of the tes-
tator which would effectively vest the trustee with greater
discretion than that granted by the trust instrument. 310
2. Spouses and Minor Children.
A number of courts have held that the needs of a current spouse
may be taken into account where support trusts are concerned.311 The
301 Id. at 449.
302 Id. at 448.
303 Id.
304 Id. at 449.
305 Id.
306 Id. at 452.
307 Id. at 450.
308 Id.
309 Id. at 451.
310 Id. at 452.
311 See Robison v. Elston Bank & Tr. Co., 48 N.E.2d 181, 189 (Ind. Ct. App. 1943);
Reynolds v. Reynolds, 180 S.E. 70, 77 (N.C. 1935); see also Gardner v. O'Loughlin, 84 A.
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rationale for these decisions is that the spouse stands in the trust benefi-
ciary's shoes because the beneficiary has a legal duty to support the
spouse.312 However, courts have shown less willingness to allow ex-
spouses to seek payment from a former spouse's interest in a support
trust. For example, in Culver v. Culver,313 Betty Culver requested a
court to order a trustee to pay back alimony payments from a support
trust established by her former husband, Knight Culver.314 The trust
permitted the trustee "in its absolute and uncontrolled discretion, to pay
to or for the benefit of [Knight] . . . parts of the principal of this trust,
from time to time in the event of an emergency effecting him, his wife or
children." 315 On appeal, the court upheld the right of the trustee to de-
termine whether an emergency existed and refused to overrule the-trus-
tee's finding that an emergency did not exist.3 16
Courts seem to have taken the same approach in child support
cases as well. For example, in Matthews v. Matthews,317 the plaintiff
sought to collect child support payments from a testamentary trust cre-
ated by the beneficiary's father.3 18 The will authorized the trustee to pay
the testator's son, William Matthews, "such part of the income derived
from such trust fund as the trustee in his sole discretion shall deem nec-
essary for his reasonable support, maintenance and health, or for any
extraordinary expense caused by his illness, accident or other emer-
gency." 319 On appeal, the court observed that the trust was neither
purely a discretionary trust nor a support trust.320 Therefore, it con-
cluded that William had an interest in the trust, at least as far as his
support needs were concerned.321 Furthermore, the court reasoned that
the child of the beneficiary of such a trust, in the absence of an express
exclusion in the trust, should be able to recover from it.322 The court
concluded that the child should be able to recover from the trust, declar-
ing that "the beneficiary should not be allowed to enjoy his interest
while neglecting to support his children." 323 Accordingly, the appeals
court reversed the ruling of the lower court and held that the plaintiff
935 (N.H. 1912) (holding that the trustee of discretionary support trust required to take
into account the needs of beneficiary's wife and children).
312 See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 180 S.E. 70, 77 (N.C. 1935).
313 Culver v. Culver, 169 N.E.2d 486 (Ohio Ct. App. 1960).
314 Id. at 487.
315 Id. at 488.
316 Id. at 489-90.
317 450 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
318 Id. at 279.
319 Id. at 280.
320 Id. at 281.
321 Id.
322 Id.
323 Id.
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could recover any surplus income each year for back child support pay-
ments that was not required for other obligations of the trust.3 2 4
3. Government Creditors.
If the trust is a mandatory support trust, the trustee can usually be
compelled to distribute trust assets to reimburse the suppliers of neces-
sary goods and services when the trust directs the trustee to distribute
such trust income or principal as is necessary to meet the support and
maintenance needs of the beneficiary. 325 Thus, providers of housing,
medical services and other welfare benefits can force the trustee to pay
for these services.326 However, there is less agreement when the trustee
has the discretion to provide, or not to provide, for the beneficiary's
maintenance and support.327 In such cases, many courts have rejected
claims against the trust.3 2 8
Pohlmann ex rel. Pohlmann v. Nebraska Department of Health &
Human Services is illustrative. 329 Pohlmann involved an appeal from a
lower court decision affirming the state's denial of Ruth Pohlmann's ap-
plication for Medicaid benefits based on the alleged availability of funds
in a marital trust established by her husband.330 In his will, Ruth's hus-
band, Herman, established a trust which provided that Ruth was to re-
ceive all of the income "and such portion of the principal as [the trustee]
may, from time to time, deem appropriate for her health, education,
support or maintenance." 3 31 Herman died in 2000 and three years later
Ruth applied to the Department of Health and Human Services
(DHHS) for Medicaid benefits.332 However, the Department denied her
324 Id. at 282.
325 See, e.g., In re Leona Carlisle Tr., 498 N.W.2d 260, 264 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993);
Chenot v. Bordeleau, 561 A.2d 891, 894 (R.I. 1989).
326 See, e.g., In re Estate of Yturburru, 66 P. 729, 729 (Cal. 1901); Strojek v. Harden
Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999); Safe Deposit & Tr.
Co. v. Robertson, 65 A.2d 292, 295 (Md. 1949).
327 See Carol Ann Mooney, Discretionary Trusts: An Estate Plan to Supplement Pub-
lic Assistance for Disabled Persons, 25 ARIz. L. REv. 939, 942-43 (1983).
328 See, e.g., City of Bridgeport v. Reilly, 47 A.2d 865, 868 (Conn. 1946); Myers v.
Kan. Dep't of Soc. & Rehab. Serv., 866 P.2d 1052, 1059 (Kan. 1994); First Nat'l Bank of
Md. v. Dep't of Health & Mental Hygiene, 399 A.2d 891, 896 (Md. 1979); Town of Ran-
dolph v. Roberts, 195 N.E.2d 72, 73-74 (Mass. 1964); In re Leona Carlisle Tr., 498 N.W.2d
260, 266 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Pohlmann ex rel. Pohlmann v. Neb. Dep't of Health &
Human Serv., 710 N.W.2d 639, 646 (Neb. 2006); Lang v. Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 528 A.2d
1335, 1345 (Pa. 1986); Chenot, 561 A.2d at 894.
329 710 N.W.2d at 645.
330 Id. at 641.
331 Id.
332 Id.
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application in part because it concluded that resources were available to
Ruth from the trust.333
On appeal, the Nebraska court declared that in order to determine
whether the corpus of a trust is a resource that is "available" to a Medi-
caid applicant, it should distinguish between discretionary trusts and
support trusts.334 According to the court, because a beneficiary can com-
pel the trustee to distribute principal or income as necessary for the ben-
eficiary's support, the Department could take the trust assets into
account when deciding questions of eligibility. 3 3 5 However, the court
reasoned, since the beneficiary of a discretionary trust cannot compel
the trustee to make distributions, the Department can only consider
those distributions of income or principal that the trustee actually makes
as available assets when evaluating the beneficiary's eligibility for Medi-
caid assistance. 336 In this case, the court held that because Ruth could
not compel the trustee of the trust to make a distribution to her, the
Department could not take it into account in determining her eligibility
for Medicaid benefits.337
However, a few decisions, such as State v. Rubion,338 have upheld a
government demand that the trustee distribute trust funds for the bene-
ficiary's support.339 The trust in that case was created by the benefici-
ary's grandmother and declared that the "trustee shall, at his discretion,
and by the exercise of his own judgment, provide a means for the sup-
port and maintenance of my grand-daughter and adopted daughter, Ella
Hansley, who, at this time is unable to provide for herself." 340 The state
brought a suit to require the trust to reimburse it for the cost of provid-
ing support to Ella at the Abilene State Hospital from 1945 to 1953.341 It
appears that Ella was an epileptic who was cared for by her grand-
mother before being admitted to the state hospital in 1945.342 The lower
courts held in favor of the trustee,343 but the Texas Supreme Court re-
versed on appeal, concluding, notwithstanding the trust's discretionary
language, that the testator intended that the trust property should be
used solely for Ella's present and future support.344 Consequently, the
333 Id. at 641-42.
334 Id. at 645.
335 Id.
336 Id.
337 Id. at 646.
338 308 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1957).
339 Id. at 9.
340 Id. at 7.
341 Id. at 5.
342 Id. at 6.
343 Id. at 4.
344 Id. at 8-9, 11.
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court determined that the trustee's refusal to make any payments to the
state was an abuse of discretion.345
An Iowa reached a similar conclusion in Strojek v. Hardin County
Board of Supervisors.346 Marie Strojek was a mentally handicapped 63-
year-old woman who had resided at an institution for the mentally dis-
abled since 1981.347 The County paid almost $22,000 per year for her
care.348 Marie's father created a trust for Marie and her sister, Caroline,
who acted as trustee, which declared that "[m]y trustee shall from time
to time, pay or apply for the benefit of my daughter, Marie Helen
Strojek, such sums from the income and principal as my trustee in the
exercise of her sole discretion deems necessary or advisable, to provide
for her proper care, support, maintenance and education." 349 The trust
paid the County $10,000 per year to help defray the cost of Marie's
care.350 However, in 1997, the County informed Caroline that Marie
would no longer qualify for assistance because the trust assets exceeded
the allowable minimum.3 51 The lower court upheld the County's
decision. 352
On appeal, the court distinguished between discretionary and sup-
port trusts and pointed out that providers of necessary goods and ser-
vices could seek reimbursement from the trustee of a support trust.353 In
contrast, creditors of the beneficiary ordinarily could not reach the as-
sets of a discretionary trust.354 At the same time, the court observed that
some trusts had features of both discretionary and support trusts and
that it was difficult to decide which rule to apply in such cases. 355 The
court resolved this dilemma by adopting the concept of a "discretionary
support trust," from Nebraska.356 According to the court, "[a] discre-
tionary support trust is created when the settlor combines explicit dis-
cretionary language 'with language that, in itself, would be deemed to
create a pure support trust." 357 In such cases, the court held, the trust
would establish minimal distributions that the trustee must make in or-
der to comply with the settlor's intent to provide the beneficiary with
345 Id. at 9.
346 602 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa Ct. App. 1999).
347 Id. at 568.
348 Id.
349 Id.
350 Id.
351 Id.
352 Id.
353 Id. at 568-69.
354 Id. at 569.
355 Id.
356 Id.
357 Id. at 570.
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basic support while retaining broad discretionary power.3 58 Therefore,
the court concluded that either Marie or the County could reach those
trust assets that were necessary to satisfy Marie's basic needs.3 59 Fur-
thermore, the County could take Marie's interest in the trust into ac-
count when determining her eligibility for government support.3 60
B. Discretionary Trusts.
1. Ordinary Creditors.
According to the traditional view, general creditors of the benefici-
ary of a discretionary trust were not able to reach the assets of the trust
until the trustee exercised his discretion to distribute them to the benefi-
ciary.36 1 The rationale for this rule was the familiar one that since the
beneficiary of a discretionary trust cannot compel the trustee to dis-
tribute funds to himself from the trust, the creditor of such a beneficiary
cannot compel a distribution either.362 For example, in Calloway v.
Smith, 363 two judgment creditors sought to reach the beneficial interest
in a testamentary trust established for the debtor, Latta Smith, by his
mother, Rose Smith.3 6 The lower court ruled that Latta's creditors
could not reach any of the trust's assets.365 On appeal, the Kentucky
court reasoned that the creditor's rights against the trustee could be no
better than the beneficiary's. 366 According to the court, "[i]t is obvious
that the exercise of the discretion of giving to Latta is not subject to
control by Latta, and conferred upon him no right which he could en-
force." 367 Therefore, the judgment of the lower court was affirmed. 36 8
2. Spouses and Minor Children.
Some courts refuse to take a beneficiary's interest in a discretionary
trust into account in calculating the parties' respective marital interests
358 Id.
359 Id. at 571.
360 Id.
361 See, e.g., In re Tone's Estates, 39 N.W.2d 401, 405-06 (Iowa 1949); Calloway v.
Smith, 186 S.W.2d 642, 643-44 (Ky. 1945).
362 See Mooney, supra note 327, at 943-44.
363 186 S.W.2d 642.
364 Id. at 642.
365 Id.
366 Id. at 643.
367 Id. at 644.
368 Id.
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in divorce cases.369 In re Marriage of Guinn370 illustrates this approach.
In that case, the wife challenged the trial court's decision that her hus-
band's interest in an irrevocable trust did not constitute a property inter-
est.3 7 1 The trust was established by the husband's parents in 1990 and
provided that the trustees, the husband's parents, could distribute in-
come to him.3 7 2 After the husband's death, the trust was to continue for
the benefit of the husband's descendants.373 Although, the court found
that the obligation to distribute income to the husband was mandatory,
it also concluded that the trustees did not have to invest the trust princi-
pal in a way to generate income, but could pursue an investment strat-
egy to maximize growth. 374 The appellate court affirmed the lower
court's decision, declaring that "when the beneficiary has no interest in
the corpus, and no right to control how the corpus is invested, we con-
clude that the income is a mere gratuity deriving from the beneficence
of the settlors."3 75
A Massachusetts appellate court reached a similar result in D.L. v.
G.L. 3 7 6 This case involved seven trusts, with assets of more than $100
million, that were created by members of the husband's family between
1921 and 1963.377 When the beneficiary and his wife were divorced, the
trial court refused to include the trust property in the marital estate for
purposes of equitable division and the wife appealed.378 The appeals
court observed that the husband's interest in three of the trusts was ei-
ther contingent or subject to divestment, and for that reason, were prop-
369 See, e.g., In re Marriage of Jones, 812 P.2d 1152, 1156-57 (Colo. 1991); In re Mar-
riage of Guinn, 93 P.3d 568, 571-72 (Colo. App. 2004); In re Marriage of Rosenblum, 602
P.2d 892, 894 (Colo. App. 1979); Loeb v. Loeb, 301 N.E.2d 349, 357-58 (Ind. 1973). How-
ever, while refusing to treat such trusts as part of the couple's marital estate, some courts
will take them into account as an "economic circumstance" when dividing up marital
property or determining alimony or child support. See, e.g., Athorne v. Athorne, 128
A.2d 910, 914 (N.H. 1957); In re Marriage of Balanson, 25 P.3d 28, 33, 43 (Colo. 2001);
Jones, 812 P.2d at 1158.
370 93 P.3d at 571.
371 Id. at 569.
372 Id. at 570.
373 Id.
374 Id.
375 Id. at 572.
376 811 N.E.2d 1013 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004).
377 Id. at 1021-29. The court referred to these as the (1) Children's Trust, (2) 1922
Trust, (3) Great-Grandfather Trust, (4) 1921 Trust, (5) 1934 Trust, (6) 1962 G.L., Sr. Trust,
and (7) Employees' Trust. Id.
378 Id. at 1016. However, the court did determine that it could take into account in
calculating alimony and child support income that the husband regularly received from
four of these discretionary trusts. Id. at 1019.
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erly excluded from the marital estate. 379 The court concluded that the
remaining trusts were discretionary in nature.380 For example, the Chil-
dren's Trust, established by the husband's grandmother, provided that
the trustees were authorized to pay to each grandchild, including the
husband, "such amount or amounts from the net income and principal
as the disinterested trustees, in their uncontrolled discretion, think ad-
visable."3 81 The other trusts contained similar language.382 Although the
court in D.L. acknowledged that a judge was "not necessarily precluded
from including within the marital estate . . . a party's beneficial interest
in a discretionary trust," it concluded in this case that the husband's in-
terest in the trust assets was "too remote or speculative" to be included
within the marital estate." 383
Another issue is whether a divorced spouse can reach the assets of
a discretionary trust to satisfy an alimony or maintenance award. In re
Watts 3 8 4 involved a testamentary trust which provided that the dece-
dent's son, Corwin Grant Watts, was to receive from the trust "such
sums of money as shall in [the judgment of the trustees] be necessary for
the proper maintenance, support and education of said Corwin Grant
Watts."385 The trust also declared that when Corwin reached the age of
twenty-one, the trustees were authorized to transfer the trust corpus to
him if
in the judgment and discretion [of the trustees], said Corwin
Grant Watts has attained sufficient business judgment and oth-
erwise shows himself to be capable of handling such property,
but the trustees are directed to hold and invest such property
as herein provided until they have determined said Corwin
Grant Watts to be a suitable person to handle same.3 8 6
Corwin married Nellie Watts in 1924 and a child, Imogene, was
born to them in 1926.387 In 1931, a local court ordered the trustee to
distribute certain amounts from the trust for Corwin and his family's
support.388 Nellie obtained a divorce in 1944 and was awarded ali-
379 Id. at 1024-27. That is, the 1922 Trust, the Great-Grandfather Trust, and the 1921
Trust. Id.
380 Id. at 1021-24, 1027-29. That is, the Children's Trust, the 1934 Trust, the 1962 G.L.,
Sr. Trust, and the Employees' Trust. Id.
381 Id. at 1021 n.10.
382 Id. at 1027-29.
383 Id. at 1023-24.
384 162 P.2d 82 (Kan. 1945).
385 Id. at 84.
386 Id.
387 Id.
388 Id.
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mony.3 8 9 When Corwin failed to make the required alimony payments,
Nellie requested the court to order the trustee to make the payments
directly to her. Although Corwin did not contest this ruling, the trustee
did, arguing that there was not likely to be sufficient income from the
trust to make the required alimony payments and it would probably
have to invade the corpus of the trust to comply with the court's rul-
ing.3 On appeal, the Kansas Supreme Court observed,
[I]n the exercise of his discretion, [the trustee] has determined
and is of the opinion that said Corwin Grant Watts will never
"attain sufficient business judgment and otherwise show him-
self to be capable of handling such property," and that said
Watts is and always will be a spendthrift and utterly incapable
of handling said property or of supporting himself and that it
will be necessary to support said Watts out of said trust prop-
erty for the remainder of his lifetime. 391
Since the trustee had determined that Corwin should not have access to
the trust principal, it followed that his ex-wife had no right to it ei-
ther.3 9 2 Therefore, the court concluded that Nellie was not entitled to a
court order to compel the trustee to pay her alimony claim. 3 9 3
On the other hand, the Florida Supreme Court in Bacardi v.
White3 94 declared that a court could issue a writ of garnishment with
respect to disbursements made to the beneficiary of a discretionary
trust.3 9 5 In Bacardi, when Luis and Adriana Bacardi divorced, Luis
agreed to pay Adriana $2000 per month until the death of either of them
or until she remarried. 396 When Luis stopped making alimony pay-
ments, Adriana obtained a writ of garnishment against the trustee of a
trust created by Luis's father for the benefit of his son. 3 9 7 The Florida
court upheld the garnishment order, notwithstanding the existence of a
spendthrift clause. 398 However, the court distinguished between
mandatory and discretionary disbursements, declaring,
If, under the terms of the trust, disbursement of corpus or in-
come is due to the debtor-beneficiary, such disbursement may
be subject to garnishment. If disbursements are wholly within
389 Id.
390 Id. at 85.
391 Id.
392 Id. at 88.
393 Id.
394 463 So.2d 218 (Fla. 1985).
395 Id. at 222.
396 Id. at 220.
397 Id.
398 Id. at 222.
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the trustee's discretion, the court may not order the trustee to
make such disbursements. However, if the trustee exercises its
discretion and makes a disbursement, that disbursement may
be subject to a writ of garnishment. 399
The court held that a continuing garnishment order was valid and also
ruled that a garnishment order could also be issued to collect the wife's
attorney's fees.400
In Berlinger v. Casselberry,401 Bruce Berlinger's former wife,
Roberta Casselberry, obtained a continuing writ of garnishment over
any present and future disbursements made by Sun Trust, the trustee of
the Berlinger Discretionary Trusts, to Berlinger or for his benefit in or-
der to pay the alimony obligations that were due to her.40 2 When their
marriage ended in 2007, Bruce agreed to pay his ex-wife $16,000 a
month as part of their settlement agreement, but stopped making pay-
ments in May 2011.403 During the ensuing litigation, it was discovered
that Bruce received substantial amounts of money from the Berlinger
Discretionary Trusts.404 On appeal, the court affirmed the lower court's
grant of a writ of garnishment against discretionary distributions by the
trustee, but also pointed out that the ex-spouse could not compel the
trustee to make distributions.405
Under the traditional rule, courts have refused to enforce child-sup-
port claims against the trustee of a discretionary trust.4 0 6 For example,
in Southeast Bank,407 Sandra Stone, the ex-wife of Harry Mundy,
brought suit against the trustee of a trust established by Harry's grandfa-
ther in order to force it to pay her ex-husband's child-support obliga-
tions.408 The trust instrument declared that all disbursements from the
trust to Harry were to be made at the sole discretion of the trustee.409
The lower court ordered the trustee to deduct Harry's child support
399 Id.
400 Id. at 223.
401 133 So.3d 961 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2013).
402 Id. at 962.
403 Id.
404 Id. at 963. The Trusts did not pay Bruce directly, but provided him with a Visa
card on which the Trusts paid the balance each month. Id. Bruce and his new wife
charged expenses to the credit card for such things as travel, entertainment, clothing,
medical care, grooming, and gifts. Id. He also made cash advances on the credit card to
provide cash to his current wife and to pay their maid. Id. at 964-65.
405 Id. at 966.
406 See Southeast Bank of Sarasota v. Stone, 500 So. 2d 737, 739 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1987); Doksansky v. Norwest Bank Nebraska, N.A., 615 N.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Neb. 2000).
407 500 So. 2d 737.
408 Id. at 737-38.
409 Id. at 737.
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payments from his trust account and the trustee appealed.410 However,
the intermediate appellate court ruled that the state child support stat-
ute, which authorized a court to order child support to be deducted from
all money "due and payable" to the parent, did not apply to trusts where
distributions were wholly within the discretion of the trustee.411
A Texas intermediate appellate court in Kolpack v. Torres412 also
refused to allow the mother of a minor child to recover back child-sup-
port payments from the beneficiary of a discretionary trust. 4 1 3 The court
ruled that the plaintiff stood in the shoes of the trust beneficiary and did
not have an independent claim against the trust.4 14 Consequently, she
couldn't proceed against the trust until she had first obtained a judg-
ment against the beneficiary. 415
3. Government Creditors.
Suits against trust beneficiaries by government entities fall into two
major categories: claims by the federal government to recover back
taxes and suits involving eligibility for welfare benefits. Most of these
cases involve attempts by the federal government to reach the assets of
a trust in order to recover back taxes from a delinquent taxpayer.416
Such attempts will usually be successful if the trust is mandatory 417 or if
taxpayer has power over the trust, such as a general power of appoint-
ment or the right to terminate the trust.418 On the other hand, as the
O'Shaughnessy419 case illustrates, the federal government stands in no
better position than other creditors when a trust is purely
discretionary.420
O'Shaughnessy involved two trusts created by the taxpayer's grand-
parents in 1951.421 The beneficiaries were the settlors' seventeen
grandchildren, including the delinquent taxpayer, Lawrence
O'Shaughnessy. 422 The trust instruments, which were identical, declared
that the trustees "in their discretion may pay to [Lawrence] . . . all or
410 Id. at 738.
411 Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 61.1301).
412 829 S.W.2d 913 (Tex. App. 1992).
413 Id. at 915.
414 Id.
415 Id. at 916.
416 See, e.g., Magavern v. United States, 550 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v.
Delano, 182 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (D. Colo. 2001); Mercantile Tr. Co. v. Hofferbert, 58 F.
Supp. 701 (D. Md. 1944); United States v. O'Shaughnessy, 517 N.W.2d 574 (Minn. 1994).
417 Magavern, 550 F.2d at 801.
418 See Delano, 182 F. Supp. 2d at 1023.
419 517 N.W.2d 574.
420 Id. at 577.
421 Id. at 576.
422 Id.
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part of the principal or annual net income of the trust estate as they
shall see fit during his lifetime."42 3 The trust instrument also gave Law-
rence a special (or limited) testamentary power of appointment.424
In 1989, the government assessed a federal income tax deficiency of
more than $400,000 against Lawrence and sought to levy upon the trust
property to satisfy the deficiency.425 Later, in 1993, the government filed
suit in federal court to enforce the levy and the trustee moved to dismiss
the suit. 4 2 6 Thereupon, the federal court certified to the Minnesota Su-
preme Court the question of whether the beneficiary of a discretionary
trust has a property interest in undistributed principal or income prior to
any exercise of discretion by the trustee. 427
The Minnesota court acknowledged that Lawrence had a sufficient
beneficial interest in the trust to compel the trustees to perform their
duties and to enjoin them from committing a breach of trust.428 How-
ever, the court also observed that the trustees "were not required in the
exercise of their absolute discretion to distribute any of the trust assets
to Lawrence. . . ."429 Consequently, it concluded that Lawrence did not
have any "property" or "right to property" in the trust assets prior to
the time the trustees saw fit to distribute them to him.4 3 0
Most claims by and against state and local governmental entities
involve eligibility for Medicaid and other welfare benefits. In some
cases, the government has sought to recoup a beneficiary's welfare costs
from a trust or charge the trust for future care,431 and in others a benefi-
ciary who has been denied such benefits has argued that trust assets
should not be taken into account in determining eligibility.432 However,
regardless of whether the beneficiary (or the trust) is the plaintiff or the
defendant, the issue in all of these cases is whether the beneficiary has a
423 Id.
424 Id.
425 Id.
426 Id.
427 Id.
428 Id. at 577.
429 Id. at 578.
430 Id.
431 See In re Estate of Lackmann, 320 P.2d 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 1958); City of
Bridgeport v. Reilly, 47 A.2d 865 (Conn. 1946); First Nat'l Bank of Md. v. Dep't of
Health & Mental Hygiene, 399 A.2d 891 (Md. 1979); Town of Randolph v. Roberts, 195
N.E.2d 72 (Mass. 1964); State v. Rubion, 308 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. 1957).
432 See, e.g., Strojek v. Harden Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1999); Myers v. Kan. Dep't of Social & Rehab. Servs., 866 P.2d 1052 (Kan. 1994); In
re Leona Carlisle Tr., 498 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Pohlmann ex rel. Pohlmann
v. Neb. Dep't of Health & Human Serv., 710 N.W.2d 639, 646 (Neb. 2006); Lang v. Dep't
of Pub. Welfare, 528 A.2d 1335 (Pa. 1986); Chenot v. Bordeleau, 561 A.2d 891 (R.I.
1989).
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sufficient property interest in a discretionary trust to affect the state's
obligation to provide for his welfare.
This issue occasionally arises in connection with discretionary
trusts. For example, in Chenot v. Bordeleau,433 the state Department of
Human Services (DHS) terminated medical assistance benefits to Ed-
ward Chenot, a mildly retarded adult, when it learned that he was the
beneficiary of a testamentary trust established by his father.434 The trust
provided that
the trustee may at any time or times pay all or any portion of
the net income or principal or both net income or principal of
the trust to or for the benefit of my son, Edward A. Chenot, as
the said trustee, in its sole and uncontrolled discretion, shall
deem necessary or advisable for his comfort, support and
welfare.4 35
The DHS terminated Edward's benefits when the trustee refused to re-
imburse it for the cost of his care in a treatment facility for mentally
retarded persons.436 When Edward brought suit to restore his benefits,
the lower court held in his favor and the DHS appealed.437
The Rhode Island Supreme Court distinguished between support
trusts and discretionary trusts and declared that assets in a support trust
would usually be considered resources of an applicant who applies for
welfare benefits. 438 However, the court observed that government
health care providers could not take assets in a wholly discretionary
trust into account when determining eligibility because the beneficiary
could not compel the trustee to distribute any funds to him from the
trust unless there was an abuse of discretion.439 Unfortunately, the trust
in question was an amalgamation of the two. 4 4 0 The court rejected the
DHS's argument that the trust was a support trust and instead con-
cluded that it was discretionary:
The language relied upon by DHS merely directs the trustee to
exercise its discretion on Edward's behalf. The trustee is in no
way required to provide a specific type of support to Edward.
The trustee is only required to make disbursements of trust as-
sets that it deems "necessary or advisable for [Edward's] com-
fort, support and welfare." Since we find this language to be an
433 561 A.2d 891.
434 See id. at 892.
435 Id.
436 Id. at 893
437 Id.
438 Id. at 894.
439 Id.
440 Id.
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insignificant limitation on the trustee's discretionary powers,
we hold that the father's words created a discretionary trust.4 4 1
Accordingly, the court held that DHS should not have treated the trust
assets as resources of Edward when considering his eligibility for contin-
ued health care benefits. 4 4 2
A Minnesota court reached a similar result in the Leona Carlisle
case. 4 4 3 James Carlisle, the beneficiary in that case, was 56 years old and
had been afflicted with severe cerebral palsy since birth.44 4 Although
James ran his own accounting business, he lived with his mother, Leona,
until she was no longer able to care for him." 5 In 1979, James began to
receive medical assistance from the County Human Services agency and
in 1985, Leona created a trust for him.4 4 6 The trust authorized the trus-
tee to distribute such funds to James for entertainment, education,
travel, comfort, convenience and reasonable luxuries "as the trustee in
its full discretion deems advisable."" 7 At the same time, the trust pro-
hibited the trustee from making any distributions for James' "food, shel-
ter, clothing, medical care or other basic necessities as provided or to be
provided by any governmental unit." 448 In 1992, the County concluded
that the trust was an available asset for purposes of determining James'
eligibility for medical assistance and terminated his benefits because his
assets exceeded the allowable limit for eligibility.4 4 9
On appeal from a judgment for the County, the appellate court first
determined that the trust was discretionary because "the trustee had
complete discretion to distribute trust assets to [James]. "450 Next, the
court considered the settlor's intent in creating the trust and concluded
that Leona intended for the trust to supplement rather than supplant
any public assistance that James might be entitled to receive.4 5 1 Finally,
the court declared that as a matter of public policy, "settlors attempting
to provide for a handicapped person should not be required to either
bankrupt estates or leave the disadvantaged party to the vagaries of
public assistance programs." 4 5 2 Accordingly, it held that the County
441 Id.
442 Id.
443 In re Leona Carlisle Tr., 498 N.W.2d 260 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993).
444 Id. at 262.
445 Id.
446 Id.
447 Id.
448 Id.
449 Id. at 263.
450 Id. at 265.
451 Id.
452 Id. (quoting Trust Co. of Okla. v. State ex rel. Dept. of Human Servs., 825 P.2d
1295, 1303 (Okla. 1991)).
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should not treat the trust as an available asset for purposes of determin-
ing James' eligibility for medical assistance. 453
C. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts and the Uniform Trust Code.
Both the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code have addressed
the issue of creditors' rights. Section 60 of the Restatement declares,
[s]ubject to the rules stated in § 58 and § 59 (on spendthrift
trusts), if the terms of a trust provide for a beneficiary to re-
ceive distributions in the trustee's discretion, a transferee or
creditor of the beneficiary is entitled to receive or attach any
distributions the trustee makes or is required to make in the
exercise of that discretion after the trustee has knowledge of
the transfer or attachment. The amounts a creditor can reach
may be limited to provide for the beneficiary's needs (Com-
ment c), or the amounts may be increased where the benefici-
ary either is the settlor (Comment f) or holds the discretionary
power to determine his or her own distributions (Comment
g).454
Various comments flesh out this section significantly. Some of these
comments merely restate existing law. For example, comment f states
that creditors of a self-settled discretionary trust are entitled to reach
the maximum amount that the trustee could pay to or on behalf of the
settlor-beneficiary. 455 Comment g applies the same principle to the situ-
ation where the trustee of a discretionary trust is also a beneficiary and
has the power to determine his or her own benefits.456 On the other
hand, comment c declares that "the creditors of the beneficiary of a dis-
cretionary interest may attach that interest and may subject it to the
satisfaction of enforceable claims by appropriate process. . . . "457 The
effect of this provision on creditors' rights is further addressed in com-
ment e. Comment c also introduces the concept of equitable discretion
under which a court, in the case of a support trust, may take account of a
beneficiary's actual needs when deciding how much a creditor is entitled
to obtain from the trustee. 458
Comment e deals with the critical question of when a creditor can
compel a trustee to exercise its discretion in favor of making a distribu-
tion to a debtor-beneficiary. The comment first sets forth the traditional
453 Id. at 266.
454 RESTATEMENT (T-ERD) OF TRUSTS § 60 (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
455 Id. § 60, cmt. f.
456 Id. § 60, cmt. g.
457 Id. § 60, cmt. c.
458 Id.
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rule that "[a] transferee or creditor of a trust beneficiary cannot compel
the trustee to make discretionary distributions if the beneficiary person-
ally could not do so." 4 5 9 However, comment e goes on to declare that
"[i]t is rare, however, that the beneficiary's circumstances, the terms of
the discretionary power, and the purposes of the trust leave the benefici-
ary so powerless." 460 Furthermore, the comment states that the exercise
or nonexercise of fiduciary discretion is always subject to judicial review
to prevent abuse and the rights of a creditor are also entitled to judicial
protection from abuse of discretion by the trustee.461 This suggests that
courts might routinely compel a trustee to make distributions even when
they go directly to a creditor. However, comment e seemingly qualifies
this interpretation by declaring,
[o]n the other hand, a trustee's refusal to make distributions
might not constitute an abuse as against an assignee or creditor
even when, under the standards applicable to the power, a de-
cision to refuse distributions to the beneficiary might have con-
stituted an abuse in the absence of the assignment or
attachment.462
Finally, comment e concludes by providing that a court might allow a
creditor to compel distributions if it concludes that the trustee would be
guilty of an abuse of discretion if it withheld or severely limited distribu-
tions that would normally be required under the terms of the trust.463
The Uniform Trust Code also considers whether creditors may
compel the trustee of a discretionary trust to distribute trust funds to
them.4 6 4 Like comment e to section 60 of the Restatement, section
504(b) of the Code states that "a creditor of a beneficiary may not com-
pel a distribution that is subject to the trustee's discretion. . . ."465 How-
ever, the Code creates an exception to this general principle for
children, spouses and former spouses in section 504(c)(1), which de-
clares that "a distribution may be ordered by the court to satisfy a judg-
ment or court order against the beneficiary for support or maintenance
of the beneficiary's child, spouse or former spouse."466 Finally, section
504(e) enables other creditors to compel a distribution from the trust if
459 Id. § 60, cmt. e.
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Id.
463 Id.
464 See Alan Newman, Spendthrift and Discretionary Trusts: Alive and Well Under the
Uniform Trust Code, 40 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 567, 586 (2005).
465 See UNiF. TRUST CODE § 504(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2010).
466 Id. § 504(c)(1).
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the trustee is also a beneficiary and the trustee's discretion is limited by
an ascertainable standard. 467
V. SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT.
This portion of the Article will offer some suggestions for improve-
ment. These might be implemented bystatute, by judicial decision or by
modifications to the Restatement of Trusts or the Uniform Trust Code.
A. Discretion and Judicial Review.
Settlors often wish to exercise control over "their" property long
after they have departed from the scene. While courts are willing to de-
fer to a settlor's wishes up to a point, this deference is not unlimited.
One area of potential conflict involves the scope of a trustee's discretion
in both support and discretionary trusts. As discussed in the Article, set-
tlors have attempted to compel courts to accept an expanded scope of
discretion by adding various words and phrases, such as "sole," "abso-
lute," or "unfettered." However, it is doubtful that this tactic has been
very successful. Despite the efforts of settlors to exempt their trustees
from judicial scrutiny, courts have continued to oversee the conduct of
trustees.
This raises the question of what standard courts should apply when
reviewing the exercise of discretion by a trustee. Over the years, courts
have employed a variety of unhelpful words and phrases to identify the
sort of conduct that will or will not pass muster. A better approach,
embodied in the Restatement and the Uniform Trust Code, is to use
"abuse of discretion" as the sole standard to use for reviewing a trus-
tee's exercise of discretion. In order to determine whether a trustee was
guilty of an abuse of discretion, the court would have to find that the
trustee acted either unreasonably or in bad faith. The Restatement has
adopted a reasonableness standard, while the Uniform Trust Code has
chosen a good faith standard.468
B. Rights of Beneficiaries.
1. Support Trusts.
There are certain issues that are common to support trusts whether
they are "mandatory" or discretionary in nature. Specifically, once a
trustee has ascertained that a particular beneficiary is entitled to sup-
port, he must decide what level of support to provide and whether or
not to take into account the availability of other sources of support.
467 Id. § 504(e).
468 See McGovern et al., supra note 129, at 405.
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Comments d, e and f to the Restatement (Third) of Trusts section 50
provide some useful guidance on these questions.
For example, comment d sets forth the common-sense dictum that
"support" and "maintenance" mean the same thing so that courts
should not try to differentiate between them. Likewise, additional words
like "comfort" add little to the support standard, although comment d
suggests that the addition of certain other words, such as "benefit,"
"best interests" or "welfare," may authorize the trustee to provide for
luxuries that go beyond mere support.
Finally, comment d correctly provides that it should not be neces-
sary to refer to the beneficiary's station in life in order to authorize the
trustee to increase distributions when necessary to offset inflation and
pay for increased expenses. Another beneficial feature found in com-
ment e is the presumption that the trustee should be able to take a bene-
ficiary's other resources into account when determining how much is
needed to provide for his support. Of course, these should be treated as
default rules which the settlor is at liberty to override.
2. Discretionary Trusts.
It would be desirable to abandon the practice of characterizing the
interest of the beneficiary of a pure discretionary trust as an "expec-
tancy." This terminology obscures the fact that the trustees of discre-
tionary trusts owe fiduciary duties to the beneficiaries and these
beneficiaries have the legal right to hold trustees accountable when they
violate their fiduciary duties.
Another issue involves the proper standard of review for a court to
utilize when a beneficiary challenges a trustee's exercise of discretion. It
was suggested above that courts should not grant relief in such cases
unless they determine that an abuse of discretion has occurred. But this
prompts the question of what constitutes an abuse of discretion. There
are a number of possibilities, such as unreasonableness, bad faith or a
combination of other factors. 4 6 9
There is much to be said for adopting a single standard, either good
faith or reasonableness, for determining whether a trustee is guilty of an
abuse of discretion. This approach, if nothing else, has the virtue of sim-
plicity. On the other hand, it does affect the right of settlors to decide
how much discretion to place in their trustees. However, assuming that
this concern can be overcome, the question remains of what should be
469 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 50(2) (AM. LAW INST. 2003), which de-
clares that what may constitute an abuse of discretion by the trustee depends on "the
terms of the discretion, including the proper construction of any accompanying standards,
and on the settlor's purpose in granting the discretionary power and in creating the
trust."
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the proper standard. The trend seems to be moving in favor of a reason-
ableness standard and, notwithstanding the position of the Uniform
Trust Code, this appears to be the better choice.
C. Rights of Creditors.
1. Support Trusts.
The traditional approach, based on the notion that a husband was
legally obligated to support his wife and children,4 7 0 is probably still ef-
fective (when gender stereotypes are ignored) to authorize the trustee
of a support trust to provide for a beneficiary's existing spouse and mi-
nor children. Arguably, this same principle would apply after a divorce
to a beneficiary's minor children. Unlike a former spouse, who has sev-
ered his or her legal relationship with the beneficiary, children are re-
lated to the beneficiary by blood and divorce does not change this
relationship. Therefore, the trustee of a support trust, regardless of the
presence or absence of a spendthrift clause, should be allowed, or even
required, to provide support for these minor children as long as there
are sufficient funds available in the trust for this purpose. 4 71
Although the existence of a spendthrift clause does not bar claims
against a trust by a former spouse, one can argue that a former spouse
should not be able to compel the trustee of a support trust to provide
alimony or maintenance payments even though a number of courts,472
along with Uniform Trust Code, 473 protect the interests of ex-spouses in
this manner. Even so, the case for requiring a trust to provide support
for an ex-spouse is not very persuasive since the purpose of a support
trust is to provide support for the beneficiary and not for other people
who are not related to the settlor.
As far as other creditors are concerned, it is important to distin-
guish between ordinary creditors and providers of necessary goods and
services. If one believes that the sole purpose of a support trust is to
provide support for the beneficiary (and possibly children of the benefi-
ciary), it is inconsistent with the settlor's intent to allow ordinary credi-
tors to reach the trust's assets even if there was plenty of money left to
support the beneficiary. However, payments for necessary goods and
services for the beneficiary's support promote the objectives of the trust
and, therefore, should be allowed. 4 7 4 This reasoning would also appear
470 See Reynolds v. Reynolds, 180 S.E. 70, 77 (N.C. 1935).
471 See Matthews v. Matthews, 450 N.E.2d 278, 282 (Ohio Ct. App. 1981).
472 See supra Part IV(A)(2).
473 UNIF. TRUST CODE. § 404(c)(1) (UNIF. LAW. COMM'N 2010).
474 See In re Estate of Dodge, 281 N.W.2d 447, 452 (Iowa 1979).
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to justify the right of government health care providers to recover for
the costs of care and treatment.475
2. Discretionary Trusts.
Purely discretionary trusts, as well as discretionary support trusts,
are quite different from ordinary support trusts because, in theory, the
trustee may refuse to make distributions even though the beneficiary is
otherwise eligible. Reasoning that creditors stand in the shoes of benefi-
ciaries, most courts have correctly held that ordinary creditors cannot
compel the trustee of a discretionary trust or a discretionary support
trust to pay them.4 7 6 However, there seems to be a split of authority as
far as former spouses and children are concerned. 4 7 7 Given the nature of
discretionary trusts, the better approach seems to be to deny ex-spouses
and children the right to compel distributions to themselves from such
trusts. The same rationale supports the traditional rule that forecloses
suits by government creditors to recover back taxes, as well as past or
future welfare benefits, from purely discretionary trusts. This approach
also seems preferable to the Restatement's suggestion that a court might
allow a creditor to compel a distribution if it concludes that the trustee
would be guilty of an abuse of discretion if it unreasonably withheld
distributions to the beneficiary. 478
VI. CONCLUSION.
Discretionary trusts are an important and useful aspect of property
management and estate planning. As trusts continue to grow in length
and complexity, trustees will undoubtedly be vested in increased discre-
tion over the administration and distribution of trust assets. For this rea-
son, they are worthy of continuing study by legal scholars and
practitioners.
475 See Strojek v. Harden Cty. Bd. of Supervisors, 602 N.W.2d 566, 568-69 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1999).
476 See Calloway v. Smith, 186 S.W.2d 642, 644 (Ky. 1945); see also UNIF. TRUST
CODE § 504(b).
477 Compare Bacardi v. White, 463 So. 2d 218, 222 (Fla. 1985) (allowing ex-spouse to
recover from discretionary trust), with Belinger v. Casselberry, 133 So. 3d 961, 966 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 2014) (allowing payments to be made but declaring that ex-spouse could
not compel trustee of discretionary trust to make payments). See also Doksansky v.
Norwest Bank of Neb., N.A., 615 N.W.2d 104, 109-10 (Neb. 2000) (holding that discre-
tionary trust was not liable for child support obligations of beneficiary).
478 See RESTATEMENT (Tm-RD) OF TRUSTS § 50, cmt. e (AM. LAW INST. 2003).
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